Arab Vs Israeli

The most prominent fact about the Arab-Israeli conflict conflict is that Jewish vacillation causes Arabs to heat up the war. First, the Israeli wavering curve's nadirs offer the Arabs clear clues of what Israel might accept to resolve the conflict. Israel's subsequent greater demands to Arab countries are not credible and induce the Arabs to demand ever further concessions from Israel. Second, indecision causes Arabs to become afraid of Israel. Having a powerful but unpredictable Israeli neighbor leads Arabs to beef up their military arsenals and launches a spiral of violence in the Middle East conflict.

Israel's errors recall Germany's before World War I: concentration of military might, regional dominance, absence of clear political objectives, and aggressive, unpredictable policy that threatened potential enemies. Many Israelis claim they do not intend to threaten the Arabs, but Arab Israeli conflict is not about facts. The issue at hand is Arab perception of Israeli intentions in waging the conflict.

Israelis must state their political objectives clearly in terms of Israeli self-interest, follow a predictable policy in resolving the Israeli conflict with Arabs, and stop panicking Israel's neighbors who never know what Israeli is up to at any given moment. If, however, Israel decides upon the aggressive course in the Middle East conflict, do not threaten the Arabs. Establish the timeline and attack the designated Arab targets immediately. Do not let the Arabs prepare for Israeli attack and the U.S. and the U.N. intercede. To delay aggression would greatly increase the cost for Israel of prevailing in her conflict with Arabs.

Vacillation in prosecuting the Arab-Israeli conflict damages the Israeli psyche, too. Israeli government officials in office must stop stating their private views on the Arab-Israeli conflict publicly. If their views differ from the Israeli policy, let them leave the government and promote their solution to the conflict with Arabs. People remember the most far-fetched political suggestions. In the present case, the alternatives are Arab-Israeli peace at almost any cost versus Israel keeping the Palestinian territories at almost any cost. That polarizes and radicalizes Israeli society, both left and right Jews ignoring the middle options, but middle options are the reasonable ones in many conflicts. Though most Arabs did not demand a Palestinian state thirty years ago, now even most Jews with any understanding of the Arab Israeli conflict agree to the Palestinian state. Israeli society must agree on a path to resoluton of the Arab-Israeli conflict — offense, defense, or peace for territorial concessions to Palestinians and Syrians — and stop wavering.

Jewish oscillations between the desire for settling the Arab-Israeli conflict at any cost and the desire for Israel's expansion create ineffective policy for Israeli government. Israelis today are discussing about the equivalent of Sadat's 1972 peace solution to Arab Israeli conflict. Menahem Begin was looking to give up the Israeli ownership of Sinai in return for Arab recognition of de facto Israeli jurisdiction over the Palestinian territories and ending the conflict. In the end, Sinai bought Israel a dubious end of the conflict with ...