U.S. Counterintelligence Failure

U.S. Counterintelligence Failure

Introduction

According to Gentry one of the biggest problems of the literature on intelligence failures is considered failures mean that the intelligence services failed entirely as institutions. More important would be contrasting flaws with the overall performance of the intelligence services, if your overall performance is good, bad or in between. As faults are less frequent but are prominent, and overall performance tends to be invisible to outside observers, this would reinforce the need for more strategic and general reviews on the performance of the intelligence services by governments and organs of control.

Discussion

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 9/11 Commission illustrated the intelligence community, which was affected by a devastating number of bureaucratic rivalries, outdated structures, tight budget, and devastating number of main concerns become the reason for failure to draw the attention of intelligence towards potential terrorism act during the 90s and until September 11. In response to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, Legislative Body formed a Director of National Intelligence and the National Center Counter terrorism to manage intelligence.

As former CIA analyst Paul Pillar says in his book Foreign Policy, which intelligence officials have forgotten the incidence of September 11, but did not forget the intimidation posed by Terrorists. The CIA formed a unit to focus exclusively on Osama Bin Laden in 1990 and Bill Clinton, President at that time, resorted to secret operations against Al Qaeda. It was reported in the February 2001 of the intelligence community on global threats marked the terrorist network of Bin Laden as the most instant and severe danger to the America, who has the ability to do multiple attacks on U.S. without warning.

Above, the Twin Towers burning after being hit by planes on September 11, 2001 in New York. In an appearance before the UN Security Council in February 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that his accusations about Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq were based on “solid intelligence.” In fact, an estimate Intelligence October 2002 had concluded that Iraq was continuing his WMD program and could make a nuclear weapon “within a few months to a year” if it acquired enough fissile material. But the United States has never found evidence for such programs after its invasion of Iraq - a failure of intelligence that President George W. Bush called his “biggest regret”.

Here too, however, it is unclear how the fault should be attributed to intelligence, as opposed to politicians. In 2004, the Washington Post reported that President Bush and his top advisers “ignored many warnings and qualifiers” intelligence report in October 2002, and still stubbornly continued with their war plans. Analysts, for example, estimated that Saddam would not use their WMDs or give to terrorists unless Iraq was invaded. The New York Times also reported that senior Bush administration officials brandished tubes which, according to them, were destined for nuclear centrifuges in Iraq, despite the skepticism of nuclear experts.

The new secret spy agency was prepared to ...