UNITED STATES MILITARY TRANSFORMATION FROM 1975-2003

United States Military Transformation from 1975-2003

United States Military Transformation from 1975-2003

Introduction

The term "military transformation" simply must be understood in the sense of "profound change" in the army affairs.1 not necessarily imply a rapid change or on the board, or the discarding of what is working well. The changes, however, must be dramatic rather than mere improvements in the margin as more modest planes, tanks or ships. Transformation is a never ending process simple point.2 military transformations are only sometimes successful, but clearly it can even be counterproductive, because the military often include very strong concepts and uncritically.3 since mistakes are expected, coverage and the ongoing correction are key ingredients in successful transformation. This chapter deals with the military transformation in the eight years of President George W. Bush, in particular those in which Donald Rumsfeld was secretary of defense. The chapter begins with the 1990 for the context and ends with a reflection on what is coming. substantial further processing will be essential in the coming years, although perhaps with a different name and with a different character to that provided in the new century. (Feickert, 2009)

The origins of the recent U.S. military transformation is in the past decades. The underlying technologies of precision weapons and stealth, and the emphasis on expeditionary forces for rapid deployment, back in late 1970. The potential of new technologies was an important issue in the study, Wohlstetter Iklé 1988.4 Discriminate deterrence events related to the transformation, between 1975 and 2008 occurred across nine different secretaries of defense and the presidents of five years. Discussion of military transformation per se began in mid 1990, following the discussion of an impending revolution in military affairs (RMA). United States Department (DoD) Defense, the Director of the Evaluation Network of Andrew Marshall and his team nurtured much of the work of the RMA. In 1994, Secretary William Perry and Vice Admiral William Owens also defended the thinking of RMA. The idea of an RMA is that technological advances often make possible a qualitative change in the nature of war. Examples include carrier comings, the blitzkrieg, and nuclear weapons. An RMA usually involves significant changes in technology, doctrine and organization. RMA often become obsolete some earlier forms of war, when aircraft carriers supplanted battleships.5 In the context of the 1990's, it seemed obvious to some of us that profound changes were made possible by precision fires, information technology stealth, and information systems. All this may seem banal today, but since 1990, air power was treated by most officials and analysts as valuable, but not decisive. Very few aircraft were precision weapons, even though the laser-guided bombs have been developed during the Vietnam War. The army had not yet shown the switching operations on a large scale developed under the doctrine of AirLand Battle for the 1980 and most of the land forces still used models analysis of the war from sheer exhaustion from head to head. The new stealth aircraft (F-117) had not seen ...