The Cold War and U.S. Diplomacy

The Cold War and U.S. Diplomacy

Introduction

The intervention of United States in Lebanon in 1958 was a direct result of the American policy failure to attain the objectives for the Middle East, established by the Eisenhower Administration. As a result of its preoccupation with concerns of Cold War, the Eisenhower Administration, somehow, failed in devising a regional policy capable of fulfilling the rapid changes in political scenarios that swept the Arab world in the post-World War II period. The nonexistence of a coherent regional policy provides the key to settling the paradox of why such overwhelming military force was chosen to be used by the United States to suppress a crisis in a country which was, in and of itself, neither strategically nor politically significant to Western interests (Alin, 1990). This paper seeks to uncover and understand the core causes behind the missed opportunities and failures for managing the issues of the Middle East during a critical time in the relationship between the Western World and the Arabs. These issues are analyzed regarding the dynamics of the Middle East crises and the tensed situation between Lebanon and Egypt in 1958. Eisenhower Doctrine, which was followed by the President, will also be discussed in this paper, along with the effects of these diplomatic efforts for the U.S. and other countries. The advantages and disadvantages of the Eisenhower Doctrine will also be assessed.

Discussion

Lebanon Egypt Conflict

In Lebanon, the civil war was the consequence of an inherent weakness in the political structure of country. Lebanon could not hold out the pressures engendered by the union of the Cold War and the Arab Cold War. The fabric of Lebanese society was strained by these pressures, which was composed of diverse Christians and Muslims communities. A secondary role was played in the minds of US policymakers by the complexities of the Lebanese structure, as they related to the US policy formulation towards Lebanon. The major interest was to make sure that in Beirut, there was enough backing for a pro-Western government. The lack of understanding of Washington regarding the dynamics of Lebanese politics and the country's confessional structure helped to prolong the Lebanese crisis in 1958.

The background to the crisis was formed by the Cold War as the Eisenhower Administration remained concerned by Soviet endeavors to extend its control into the Middle East. In September 1955, the turning point came when, after the Israeli attack in Gaza on Egyptian positions, Egypt announced that it was buying Soviet weapons. This announcement ensued in the pulling out of Western funding for the Aswan Dam and consequently, Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal. This decision gave Nasser immense popularity. Nasser made the most of his newly acquired reputation to get involved in the internal affairs of other countries and to give intimidation to their governments if they opposed his policies. His continuous interference brought him into conflict with the British & United States backed governments of Jordan and Lebanon (Ashton, ...