THE 2002 US NATIONWIDE SECURITY STRATEGY

The 2002 US nationwide Security Strategy

The 2002 US National Security Strategy

Introduction

In the direct post-Cold conflict period it emerged as though the UN Security assembly would become the routine sanctioning agency for military interventions by Western nations. Yet by 1998 the Clinton management chose to by-pass the U.N. and directed NATO out of locality and into conflict in the previous Yugoslavia. In the course of a lone ten years the U.S. has moved from a fondness for inclusive multilateralism to exclusive multilateralism and then to the present proposal for a coalition of the eager as little as two to strike Iraq.

During the identical ten years we saw a progression in the direction of more ambitious infantry objectives -- especially, attack counter-proliferation and regime removal. The Clinton administration sought the capability to undertake offensive counter proliferation strikes and in the 1993 Bottom Up Review < http://www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/index.html > called for "Improvements in the ability of both our general purpose and special operations forces to seize, disable, or destroy arsenals of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery systems." The new Bush administration has promoted a revival of the Reagan doctrine of regime change, but rather than pursuing that objective covertly or through proxy forces as before, it now pursues it overtly and through direct military action.

At the end of his period President wilderness the Elder broadcast a relaxation of the freezing War's presumption against war, instead taking up a narrower utilitarian calculus to govern the use of force. President wilderness the Younger's new strategy takes us farther down the road toconflictd normalizing conflict as an equipment of choice for accomplishing treasured ends.

"In the freezing War, tools for fighting of mass decimation were considered tools for fighting of last holiday resort whose use risked the decimation of those who utilised them.

Today, our foes glimpse weapons of mass decimation as weapons of choice. For rogue states these tools for fighting are devices of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbors. These tools for fighting may furthermore allow these states to attempt to blackmail the joined States and our partners to avert us from deterring or repelling the hard-hitting demeanour of rogue states." (p. 15)

Key Catalysts

The following are the key catalyst for this document:

1. WMDs are not a tool for fighting of choice for "rogue states" against the U.S. because rogue states face the very same risk of destruction as was operative in the freezing War;

2. The wilderness management is, itself, pursuing development of new nuclear tools for fighting that could well be "tools for fighting of alternative" for disarming other countries or for hitting devastating assaults to the leadership and their order and order; the management is developing these tools for fighting precisely because in many envisaged scenarios the U.S. is no longer discouraged by promise retaliation; and

3. The use of the pejorative phrase "blackmail" in location of discourage" in the sentence "These tools for fighting may allow these states to try to blackmail the United States and our ...