TERRORISM

U.S Strategies for Terrorist Groups

U.S Strategies for Terrorist Groups

Introduction

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was officially created in January 2007, following an announcement made by Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda's second in command. Formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), AQIM aims to establish by violent means a pan-Islamic Shariah state covering the region of the Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania, and Libya), Niger, and Mali. AQIM has been involved in the kidnapping of foreign citizens and nationals to raise funds for its terrorist operations, as well as attacks on government facilities and banks in the region. It is estimated that AQIM has received a total of $6 million to $10 million in ransoms from kidnapping foreigners and bank robberies (Anson et.al, 2009).

Discussion

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Many terrorist experts, particularly in Algeria, dispute the transnational regional character of AQIM, arguing that its affiliation with al Qaeda is superficial. To them, AQIM is just GSPC under a different name, and they point out that, since its inception in 1999, GSPC has sought to establish ties with al Qaeda. The French journalist Jason Burke and the Algerian terrorist specialist Anoir Malek have detailed a series of contacts between al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and GSPC members. Desperate for financial assistance and weapons, GSPC sought bin Laden's help in exchange for providing al Qaeda with new recruits and training them for terrorist activities in Europe. According to Algerian observers, it took years for al Qaeda to trust GSPC. That trust finally came with Zawahiri's announcement, but the relationship between al Qaeda and AQIM remains weak (Robert, 2009).

AQIM continues to appear independent from al Qaeda, giving credence to those who believe that GSPC sought the name change to benefit from al Qaeda's notoriety as the leading enemy of the West. It is for this reason that Algerian authorities and media are adamant about not using “AQIM” as an alternate name for “GSPC,” and have further claimed that GSPC is but a memory (Bandyk, 2010).

This sentiment is true to a degree, for GSPC suffered a serious setback as a result of an aggressive war on terror pursued by the Algerian state. Since the late 1990s, Algerian authorities have engaged in a massive campaign to uproot terrorism, including offering terrorists amnesty under a national reconciliation plan in exchange for giving up violence; launching highly coordinated military operations in areas once deemed impenetrable and under terrorist control; and mobilizing well-known and respected clerics to issue fatwas (edicts) condemning terrorism as un-Islamic. Throughout this anti-terrorism campaign, the state has emphasized testimony by former terrorist leaders—including former GSPC leader Hassan Hattab—condemning terrorism and calling on terrorists to take advantage of the government's national reconciliation policy. As a result, the state has succeeded in bringing normalcy back to the country (Browne, 2000).

But terrorism is by no means over in the region. AQIM has been active in the kidnapping of Westerners visiting the region, and the group was responsible for killing ...