POLICY LEARNING

Policy Change vs. Policy Learning



Policy Change vs. Policy Learning

Introduction

In this chapter, Birkland sets the stage for examining significant disasters and the subsequent policy changes indicative of institutional lesson learning (For example, 9/11 in the context of homeland security and aviation security; earthquakes; and hurricanes). Hurricane Katrina is woven throughout as illustrative of what went right in lesson learning and what could go better. This book will be a valuable resource to those studying or advocating policy changes in response to catastrophic events. Birkland addresses the extent to which decision makers can put “successful policy learning” into practice. Birkland's review of the national agenda, evidenced by topics of congressional testimony, shows how federal attention is clearly oriented toward post-disaster relief. Birkland presents hazard mitigation policies from Florida and North Carolina and pays considerable attention to the role of state and local governments in promoting resilience.

Birkland have explored how coalitions may opportunistically pursue policy change through influencing agendas. As a result, the lessons identified may reflect the power of coalitions rather than rigorous analysis, or they may reflect the knowledge base of leading investigators. Resulting plans and guidance may, at worst, be little more than “fantasy documents” (Clarke, 2006), produced for appearance sake, with the lessons identified contested and without the support of all relevant stakeholder and policy makers.

Discussion

Although crisis events often prompt extensive investigations, organizations are often ill prepared when faced with sudden, high impact events. One limitation is the confusion of learning with identifying lessons, especially within the policy literature where “enacted legislation and regulations' indicate policy change and. .. That some sort of learning had occurred” (Birkland, 2006, p. 23). Toft and Reynolds (1997), who distinguish “passive” from “active” learning, refer to “identifying lessons” and “acting upon them,” respectively. Another limitation is that research often deals with either knowledge acquisition, or transfer, or assimilation, and rarely upon the three as an interconnected process. A piecemeal conceptualization of organizational learning from crisis is the result (Elliott, 2009). A third limitation is the potential lack of fit between lessons from the past and the demands of future events; given the idiosyncratic nature of even superficially similar crisis events, it is unlikely that a blueprint for one will be entirely suitable for another. For example, as Hurricane Rita followed Katrina, the mass evacuation of cities received even greater emphasis, yet traffic congestion left thousands of fleeing residents vulnerable on the highways. New practices and guidance shape the context for the enactment of learning during later crisis events.

Although suddenness, low probability, and high impact are seen as usual an element of crisis, a defining characteristic is the symbolic challenge presented to core assumptions and current practices. At the heart, of crisis lies their unacceptability, which motivates actors to prevent their recurrence (Brändström et al, 2004); any failure to learn appears reprehensible. Failure to learn may take a number of forms. First, the “right” lessons may not be identified. Birkland (1997) has explored how coalitions may opportunistically pursue policy change through influencing ...