OPERATION TORCH

Operation Torch

Operation Torch

Q(1): Answer: The port and carrying facilities allow the discharge every two weeks of two bdes at Algiers and one at Bone, equivalent to a build up of 1 1/2 divisions per month through Algiers and 2/3rd division at Bone. These estimates include allowance for Corps, Army and L of C Tps but do not cater for active operations taking place at the end of long L of C such as those between Algiers and Bone—400 miles, and Bone and Tunis—200 miles. When the effect of operations on these long L of C has been considered and personnel and equipment requirements of the Royal Navy and R.A.F. have been met, it is estimated that the operational availability of formations will be lower than the possible rate of build up through the ports. Exact figures cannot be provided until full details have been worked out. The final build up at and to the east of Bone cannot be given as it will depend upon the future development of that port and the air cover afforded by the R.A.F. Algiers. It is expected that Algiers and the aerodromes at Maison Blanche and Bilda will have been captured by D.3. Between D.3 and D.6 (when HQ 5 Corps and a portion of 6 Armd Div become available) the assault forces will consolidate the area of the territory. It is my opinion that this expedition which as now planned is believed...not sufficiently powerful to accomplish against the potential opposition in the general theater the purpose prescribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. If we should encounter determined resistance from the French Forces there would be little hope of gaining Tunisia ahead of Axis troops which could then be built up more rapidly than our own. If the Spanish army should be employed against us in the early weeks of the operation our communications would be in great jeopardy while the instant elimination of Gibraltar as an Air and Naval base would in itself create a difficulty of the most serious kind. This means that the chances for success of the expedition at its presently estimated strength must depend more upon political attitudes and reactions in Northern Africa than upon strictly military factors. In this connection the apparent inability of the Combined Navies to provide escorts for and attack at Casablanca along with those planned inside the Mediterranean has distinctly decreased the opportunity for creating throughout North Africa the impression of overwhelming attack, so essential to producing a readiness to accept allied occupation without material resistance. The most favorable situation that we can reasonably hope to find in Northern Africa is continued neutrality on the part of the Spanish and submission on the part of the French. Under these conditions the expedition assuming that initial and follow-up forces arrive as planned should succeed. Positive French assistance can scarcely be anticipated in view of the tremendous pressure that the enemy can exert in France on the friends, families and interests of the North ...