Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, maritime security efforts have concentrated mainly on large financial vessels, cargoes, and crew. Efforts to address the small vessel1 environment have largely been limited to traditional safety and basic law enforcement concerns. Sshopping centre vessels are, although, readily susceptible to promise exploitation by terrorists, smugglers of tools for fighting of mass decimation (WMDs), narcotics, aliens, and other contraband, and other criminals. Small vessels have also been effectively employed overseas by terrorists to consign Waterborne Improvised Explosive apparatus (WBIEDs).
Law enforcement agencies face the dispute of distinguishing between the huge number of legitimate vessel operators and the somewhat few persons committed in illicit activities. The dispute is immense, as it involves almost 13 million listed U.S. recreational vessels,2 82,000 angling vessels, and 100,000 other financial small vessels. On any granted day, a substantial number of these boats share waterways with commercial and infantry traffic, functioning at hundreds of U.S. ports and in the direct locality of critical maritime infrastructure, encompassing bridges and beachfront amenities such as petrochemical plants. More data concerning little vessels is needed to advance the correct evaluation of the risk impersonated by these vessels. The dispute is to balance the collection of requisite information necessary for correct evaluation of risk impersonated by these vessels, with the flexibility of the oceans anticipated by the small boating community.
Additionally, a significant number of these craft operate internationally, especially in regions such as the Great Lakes, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea. During Fiscal Year 2006, only 70,000 boater foreign arrivals were recorded in the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Pleasure Boat Reporting System (PBRS), based on boater self-reporting. Conservative estimates suggest that these reporting figures represent only a fraction of the actual international boater traffic, especially given the ease with which boaters operate in these waters.
Currently, the U.S. Government has an incomplete knowledge of the worldwide recreational boating public, their journey patterns, and the amenities they use. Couple this with the limited data accessible considering angling fleets and the multitude of little financial vessels functioning in or beside U.S. waters and the complexity of the topic becomes obvious.
Hence, there is a clear need to close security gaps and enhance the little vessel security environment. The little Vessel Security scheme (SVSS) addresses these anxieties and supplies a coherent framework to advance maritime security and safety. It envisions a coordinated effort of government, state, localized, and Tribal authorities, simultaneously with international partners, private commerce, and recreational users of the waterways.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) little Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) exists inside the framework of other security strategies. It does not restore any of the present schemes or applicable documents. Rather, this strategy harmonizes main headings from associated schemes into a multi-layered, unified approach for the constituent bureaus within the DHS, and to lay the groundwork for DHS participation in coordination across all levels of government, as well as other public, personal ...