The corporation belongs to stockholders and in their interest must be run. This conception finds its clearest expression in the shareholder value doctrine, according to which the corporation must be run in the interest of shareholders, creating value on their behalf. Thus the objective of management should be to maximize the market value of the company. This is in accordance, in particular, with the interest of minority shareholders, which should be adequately protected.
Table of Contents
Chapter One: Introduction3
The Stakeholder Model3
Corporate governance in the United Kingdom3
UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance3
The Turnbull Report - Combined Code Requirements3
AIM Companies3
UK Companies Act 20043
UK Companies Act 20063
Research Methodology and Method3
Positivism1
Voluntarism1
Determinism1
Ideographic1
Nomothetic1
Paradigms For Social Science Theory3
Method3
Interview3
Case Study3
Stakeholder Theory:3
Chapter Three: Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Governance3
The new concept of business ownership3
Corporate social role3
Company's capital elements constitute3
Risk Investment Income3
The concept of stakeholders is not clearly defined3
The Diversification Of Business Objectives Conflict3
Chapter Four: Shareholder Theory in Corporate Governance3
Business Ends and Compatibility with Stakeholder Model3
Chapter Six: Conclusion3
References3
Chapter One: Introduction
The corporation must be run in the interest of stakeholders. As the interest of stakeholders is various and contradictory, a compromise between the pursuit of the various interests should be found. This compromise could be trusted to managers (Berle and Means' view), to politicians, to an articulated management board, where the different instances may be represented, leading through their interaction and compromise to the specification of the overall interest of the company. According to the latter viewpoint the corporation can be seen as a community, and as such must be run. In the stakeholders' view may also be included the vision of the social responsibility of the firm, whereby society as a whole is a stakeholder. The different conceptions have their counterpart in different aspects of corporate law, from the composition and election rules of directors, to the publicity of societal documents, up to the determination of the rules that determine the framework of corporate life, concerning fusions and mergers, takeovers, and the legal framework of capital markets.2 Of the two conceptions the first seems to be dominant, especially in the Anglo-Saxon environment. In a somewhat different perspective the various corporate institutional systems prevailing in different countries may be seen, whoever are the principals, as different methods to deal with the problem of the separation of ownership and control. The second part of the present paper is dedicated in particular to the consideration of the latter issue in the specific framework of the stakeholder view.
Whatever the actual discipline of corporate governance a large scope for managerial discretion remains, leading to an agency problem, as well as a problem of collective action. This was already well understood by Adam Smith in a famous passage. “The trade of a joint stock company is always managed by a court of directors. This court, indeed, is frequently subject, in many respects, to the control of a general court of proprietors. But the greater part of those proprietors seldom pretend to understand anything of the business of the company, and when ...