Impact of Corporate Governance Disclosure on the Principal-Agency Problem within the UK Oil Sector
ABSTRACT
Corporate governance is becoming the growing concern in the firms of oil sector as it is related with the relationship between corporation's management, board of directors and shareholders. In this regard, when conflict of interests arises within relationship between management of the firm and investors or the shareholders, a problem occurs referred to as the principal-agent problem. Accordingly, the disclosure of the corporate governance information is deemed by the firms to regain the trust and satisfaction from the investors over the management of the firm. In this regard, the objective of this research is to investigate the impact of corporate governance disclosure on principal-agent problem within the UK oil sector. The current research employed the quantitative research in which descriptive analysis, multiple regressions, t-test and Spearman's correlation of 5 years (2007-2011) of top 18 oil and gas companies listed in London Stock exchange has been performed. The research formed seven null hypotheses and subsequently their alternative hypotheses and confirmed that there is a positive impact of corporate governance information disclosure on addressing principal agent problem across the proxies of both variables. Similarly, the research investigated the corporate governance mechanisms that are related with disclosure of the information and hypothesized to exert the influence on the scale of principal agent problem present in the firm. The research concluded that there is positive impact of corporate governance disclosure across all four proxies (separate leadership, greater percentage of managerial ownership, and greater percentage of non-executive directors and composition of board committee with three structures) on addressing principal agent problem via indicating that their higher levels of disclosure of the information from the managers impact significantly and positively on asset utilization ratio, return on capital employed, dividend growth rate and capital structure while impact significantly and negatively on sales to management expense ratio. The result however found that there is insignificant impact of corporate governance disclosure mechanisms on Return on Assets of principal agency problem indicating that change in corporate governance disclosure by managers does not impact return on assets of firms within the UK oil and gas sector.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACTII
LIST OF TABLESVII
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION1
Background of the Study1
Statement of the Problem2
Research Questions4
Research Aims and Objectives4
Regulatory Framework Of Corporate Governance Code In UK5
Theoretical Framework6
Significance of Study6
Justification for Selecting UK Firms as Sample for Study7
Dissertation Layout8
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW9
Introduction9
Corporate Governance10
Corporate Governance and Agency Theory11
CEO Duality15
Stakeholders' and Shareholders' Theory16
Asymmetric Information19
Stewardship Theory19
Resource Dependency Theory20
Institutional Theory21
Corporate Governance Control Mechanisms22
Internal Governance Mechanisms23
External Control Mechanisms25
The UK Corporate Governance Regulatory Framework25
The Market for Corporate Control27
Managerial Labour Market28
External Auditor28
Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure29
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY31
Introduction31
Research Approach31
Sample Selection33
Data Collection Method34
Sources of Data Collection Method34
Research Hypotheses Development35
Dependent Variable - Principal-Agency Problem37
Asset Utilization Ratio37
Sales to Management Expenses Ratio38
Return on Assets39
Return on Equity39
Return on Capital Employed40
Dividend Growth Rate40
Capital Structure41
Independent Variable - Corporate Governance Disclosure and Mechanisms41