MERIT SELECTION SYSTEM

Merit Selection System

Abstract

Scholarship on executive politics provides conflicting views about whether staffing administrative agencies through politicized or (politically) autonomous means is the best method for maximizing bureaucratic competence. We offer a theoretical account which maintains that obtaining a proper balance between both types of personnel systems across the supervisory and subordinate levels of an organization will best foster bureaucratic competence. We evaluate our organizational balancing thesis using data on executive branch general revenue fund forecasts in the American states from 1987 to 2002. States with a combination of politically appointed agency executives and merit-selected subordinates generally provide more accurate revenue forecasts than states that possess uniformly politicized personnel selection systems. Our statistical findings underscore the positive consequences associated with balancing politicized and autonomous means of selecting personnel within hierarchies of political organizations. Governance in democratic society is premised on the simple notion that the citizenry can effectively control their government. We maintain that striking a balance between at-will and (politically) autonomous personnel systems at different levels of an administrative organization is essential to maximizing bureaucratic competence. One important reason this is true is that using information provided by both at-will and autonomous personnel will produce more accurate bureaucratic decisions than when either agent type dominates both levels of an administrative organization. Our empirical evidence shows that this type of organizational balancing in the selection of agency personnel across executive and subordinate levels yields more accurate general fund revenue forecasts in the American states.

Table of Contents

Abstract2

Introduction4

Historical Background of Merit Selection7

Neutral Competence versus Responsive Competence in the Administrative State8

Organizational Balancing Between Politicization and Autonomy within Agencies11

Case Selection, Data, Variables, and Methods15

Different Personnel Selection Systems within Bureaucratic Hierarchies16

Statistical Controls19

Methods21

Statistical Findings23

Illuminating Forecast Inaccuracy by Analyzing Forecast Biases23

Discussion25

Conclusion27

References29

Merit Selection System

Introduction

As dissatisfaction with selecting judges by elections grew, reformers, led by the American Judicature Society and the American Bar Association, worked on developing a system whereby judges would be selected based on individual merit rather than politics. In 1940, Missouri became the first state to adopt a merit selection process for selecting judges. A merit selection plan (often referred to as the “Missouri Plan”), which is now used in over twenty states, has three general components: Candidates are nominated by a nominating commission, the governor appoints one of the individuals nominated by the commission, and judges must stand for periodic noncompetitive retention elections. Proponents of the merit selection process maintain that it maximizes the likelihood of selecting highly capable individuals for judgeships. A nominating commission that is qualified to evaluate judicial qualifications assures that meritorious candidates will be considered, yet citizens retain the right and ability to hold judges accountable by voting them out of office if their performance is inadequate.

States that have merit selection plans all have nonpartisan or bipartisan nominating commissions. Members of the commission are appointed by some combination of the governor, state supreme court, state bar association, and the state legislature. These commissions are typically comprised of lawyers, sitting judges, and lay citizens.

When a judicial vacancy occurs, the commission (or a ...