CASE ANALYSIS

Case Analysis

Case Analysis

Escobedo v. Illinois

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), was a crucial United States Supreme Court case about criminal suspects, who have the right to counsel during police interrogation in the framework of the Sixth Amendment. This case was decided one year after the Court held in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963), that indigent defendants were entitled to counsel at trial.

Danny Escobedo in the brother-in-law, Manuel, convicted in Chicago, was murdered on the night on 19 January, 1960. Police officers detained Danny Escobedo early the next morning, but unsuccessfully tried to question him, and eventually released him that afternoon. Ten days later, on 30 January, police questioned Benedict DiGerlando, who told them that Escobedo fired the fatal shot. The police arrested Escobedo the next day. Escobedo asked to speak to a lawyer. His attorney went to the headquarters of the police and tried to talk to Escobedo in the course of interrogation. Both requests were denied. When police told Escobedo of Escobedo said DiGerlando claim to oppose him. When this happens, Escobedo implicated himself as an accessory to murder and later confessed to the same prosecutor, and eventually was convicted of aiding and unchanged. (Amar, 1994)

Escobedo appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois, who initially was recognized as impermissible and quashed his conviction. Illinois petitioned for rehearing and the court affirmed the conviction. Escobedo appealed to U.S. Supreme Court. In ASGS argued before the court as a court Amicus favor Escobedo.

The Supreme Court overturned the verdict Escobedo, and recognized the suspect the right to counsel during police interrogation. Writing for the majority, Justice Arthur Goldberg viewed the police questioning in this case as a questioning of a particular suspect, than in the general questioning of witnesses. Thus, he drew a distinction between pre-and post-indictment to be negligible, since the police and led to the recognition of the prosecutor, after they had already received a damning statement must accuse Escobedo. To hold otherwise, Goldberg wrote, would "exalt form over substance." The Court has already recognized the right to counsel after indictment in Gideon v. Wainwright. Expansion of that precedent, he interpreted the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel, as belonging to the defendants since their primary suspects. (Amar, 1994)

Justice Potter Stewart dissent accused the majority principally conflating the formal difference between before and after indictment interrogation. Justice Byron White of dissent began with a dispute over its applicability is cited precedent. He also criticized the majority of constitutional interpretation, insisting that the Fifth Amendment protection against self-addressed in the full intention of the founders to ensure the protection of suspects during police interrogation. All dissenting opinions stressed the negative impact on the decision of the court will have to fight crime. It later reversed the holding of Miranda v. Arizona, and the Supreme Court ruled that pre-indictment interrogation violates the Fifth Amendment is not the Sixth Amendment. As Escobedo had been interrogated during interrogation in custody, the result for the plaintiff, it would ...