Abstract

This paper discusses that under Stalin's first Five Year Plans (1928-1932), the Soviet Union transitioned from Lenin's New Economic Policy to Stalin's drastic and sweeping initiatives. One of those initiatives involved the collectivization of agriculture. The Soviet people ultimately suffered from the horrible consequences of this costly initiative. The report discusses that the ultimate goal of collectivization was to consolidate individual labor and land into collective farms with intentions of increasing agricultural output to feed and ever expanding urban population supporting industrialization, as well as for export. This study will highlight the initial implementation of collectivization under Stalin, and the outcome and consequences of that policy, with emphasis on the disparity between the two.

Table of Content

CHAPTER ONE3

INTRODUCTION3

Modernizing the Soviet Economy3

National Famine5

Collectivization7

Chapter Two12

Literature Review12

Purges of the 1930's15

Revolutionary Struggle for Freedom18

Stalin era and Origin of anti Stalin Reforms19

Anti Stalin Reforms in Soviet Union21

The Resistance to Reforms24

Similarities and Differences, Gorbachev & Khrushchev25

CHAPTER THREE27

METHODOLOGY27

Literature Selection Criteria28

Search Technique28

CHAPTER FOUR29

DISCUSSION29

CHAPTER FIVE36

CONCLUSION36

WORK CITED40

Chapter One

Introduction

Modernizing the Soviet Economy

Stalin aimed to modernise the Soviet economy by collectivisation and industrialisation. Agricultural collectivisation in the First Five Year Plan (1928 - 32) involved setting up collective farms (kolkhozy) and state farms (sovkhozy); in the former peasants would manage the farms as co-operatives, in the latter the State would manage the farm. In practice there were few differences between them. Theoretically, large farms would be more efficient, fewer rural workers would be needed and thus more workers would be available for industry. Coercion was used to implement this policy. The collectivisation is defined as the 'second Revolution' or 'revolution from above' by Soviet historians. (Conquest, 15)

Bukharin and the Right interpreted the October 1917 revolution as a victory for the Bolshevik-led proletariat - revolution from below - and argued that the economy should be allowed to develop without State interference. He believed the Marxist political system would determine the economy. But Stalin wanted a faster development. His motives are not clear. The process did help to consolidate his power. He probably also believed that it was the only way to make Russia safe. He wrote "we are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall be crushed." In order to justify coercing the peasants Stalin's propaganda blamed the lack of modernisation of the USSR on the wealthy peasants - the Kulaks - he maintained they had to be broken as a class. Modern scholars do not believe such a class ever existed and if there were richer peasants they did not constitute exploitative land-owners. The Kulak myth was used to justify coercing all peasants.

In theory surplus grain would be exported to provide investment capital for industry and surplus peasants would be turned into industrial proletariat. In practice there never was a surplus of grain. Stalin said the lack of food was due to poor distribution and once again blamed the Kulaks as grain-monopolists. This lead to poorer peasants victimizing richer peasants in some ...