Research and Evaluation in National Security Affairs

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Abstract

The Obama Administration made an argument that a public announcement related to the withdrawal timeline would assist additional US counterinsurgency (COIN) objectives in Afghanistan by encouraging improved behavior from the Karzai government and the Afghan people. An endless troop commitment, the Administration believed, fostered a dependency that allowed, and possibly even encouraged, poor governance and rampant corruption to persist, a timeline, it claimed, would sever the continual dependency by signaling that US commitment would not last forever, serving to focus, energize, and quicken the Karzai government's efforts to build a secure, durable, self-sufficient state. Moreover, it argued, a timeline would send a message of urgency to the Afghan people to take charge of their own affairs and to consent to their government's rule in greater numbers. More broadly, the Afghan case, along with America's recent experience in Iraq, should make US policymakers deeply skeptical of assertions that withdrawal timelines can serve as an effective policy tool for changing the behaviors of key regional actors. Therefore, all the issues related to the topic will be discussed in detail.

Research and Evaluation in National Security Affairs

Background of the organization

In order to improve the trajectory of the war in Afghanistan, President Obama endorsed a “fully-resourced,” population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy that had an aim to drive a wedge between the insurgents and the population. On December 1, 2009, at an address at West Point, President Obama announced that he would deploy 30,000 additional troops to support the COIN effort in Afghanistan. The troops would be sent at the fastest possible pace, starting in early 2010, with a goal of starting to withdraw forces from the country in July 2011. The Obama Administration argued that the COIN strategy would break the Taliban's momentum and increase Afghan capacity by July 2011, which would allow for the beginning of a troop withdrawal. The July 2011 date, though, only marked the beginning of a withdrawal. According to the President, the actual pace of the transition and rapidity of substantial troop withdrawals is not fixed to a timeline, but rather dependent on conditions on the ground (Allison, 2004).

In November 2010, the Obama Administration added further detail to its overall exit strategy. At a NATO Lisbon Summit, the Administration, along with other NATO leaders, announced its goal for Afghan security forces to assume full responsibility for security by the end of 2014, as originally requested by President Karzai. If July 2011 marks the beginning of an exit process, and then the end of 2014 would mark its general conclusion. The Obama Administration sold the withdrawal timeline as an improved policy from the days of the Bush Administration. An endless troop commitment, the Obama Administration believed, fostered a dependency that allowed, and possibly even encouraged, poor governance and rampant corruption to persist in Afghanistan - a timeline, it claimed, would sever the continual dependency by signaling that US commitment would not last forever, serving to focus, energize, and quicken the Karzai government's efforts to build ...