White v/s Chief constable of South Yorkshire Police

White v/s Chief constable of South Yorkshire Police

Introduction

Lord Steyn offered some reasons why recovery should not be allowed in this situation. Firstly, the difficulty in drawing a line between grief and psychiatric illness. It is agreed that this is a complex area, but it is not insoluble. Whilst the symptoms are often similar, medical knowledge continues its onward march, and it is possible to tell the difference between the two conditions in the vast majority of cases. Secondly, he claimed that litigation is a disincentive to recovery. With the greatest respect, this suggestion is little short of ludicrous. Why would anyone choose to suffer, consciously or otherwise, because of a court case? If anything, this argument is in favour of recovery, and a quick one at that, for the money paid would help the sufferer to achieve closure, to put a full stop after their horrific experiences. This paper discusses the statement by Lord Steyn that “(T)he law on the recovery of compensation for pure psychiatric harm is a patchwork quilt of distinctions which are difficult to justify”.

Discussion

Lord Steyn in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1998] suggests four reasons (p 101):

Evidential problems: the difficulties in drawing the line between psychiatric illnesses and mere grief, anxiety etc.

The view that allowing claimants suffering psychiatric injury to sue may act as unconscious disincentive to them recovering from their illnesses.

'Floodgates' concerns about a significant increase in the scope of tort liability if recovery for psychiatric injury was not limited.

The potential unfairness to the defendant of imposing damages out of all proportion to the negligent conduct.

In Lord Steyn's view the only sensible general strategy for the courts is to say thus far and no further. It is pointed out that what most plaintiffs desire is not money, but recognition from the defendant of the stresses they have gone through. Thirdly, increasing the number of claimants, is a point that has already been dealt with. The final criticism to be made is of Hoffman's assertion that it is "too late to go back on the control mechanisms as stated in Alcock's case. Until there is legislative change, the courts must live with them and any judicial developments must take them into account,". There are two points to be made here. Firstly, the House of Lords can overturn its own decisions, so this claim is somewhat disingenuous: the House has missed an excellent opportunity to alter its botched job in Alcock. Secondly, legislative change, Parliamentary intervention, may now be the only thing that can alter the entrenched judicial attitudes and the tangled mass of caselaw. This, along with other options for reform will be considered in due course.

The impression that one is left with after White, and indeed all the Hillsborough litigation, is one of a court deeply unsure of its ground. None of the judgements carry that ring of authority and informed self-assurance that should be seen when dealing with matters of this ...