STRUCTURALIST THEORY AND OLSON'S COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM

Structuralist Theory and Olson's Collective Action Problem

Structuralist Theory and Olson's Collective Action Problem

Introduction

Theory of collective action is prominent in the social sciences as it explains many phenomena related to the achievement of collective or public goods among them are social movements, electoral behaviour, membership in interest groups, etc. The latest studies of collective action have been associated with the effect on the collective action of information technology (Balzer & Moulines, 2011). In contrast, a number of researchers who have applied to identify the advantages and disadvantages of the Internet in collective action realise that how does a traditional theory meet a wide range of collective actions carried out in modern society.

In the traditional literature, it is believed that one of the main obstacles to the initiation of collective action is that the first participants receive relatively little impact at the beginning. However, after the public good they get the same as others. Consequently, the public good cannot be achieved without the narrow circle resourced participants who pay the reserve price (Finlayson & Valentine, 2002). In this regard, a special place is given to the traditional theory of collective action problem in relation to the use of public goods without upfront investment. Participation in collective action may be in many forms having extreme variants of them, which can be seen as a contribution to the achievement of the benefits and use them when it has been achieved by others.

Discussion

Olson's Collective Theory

Collective action is the actions performed by two or more people in order to achieve the same public good. Public goods are characterised by a non-exclusive in consumption as most of the individuals cannot exclude any of the enjoyment of the goods. Similarly it also includes non-competitive characteristic that is the consumption of the goods by one person and does not reduce availability of the good for others. Additionally, traditional material goods and political benefits or public goods may also take more subtle forms such as informative databases and communications systems.

According to Olson, this reflects logic of rational choice of the individual, while the majority of social scientists define rationality as behaviour aimed at maximum profits and reduce expected risks. Applying this to the logic of collective action, Olson was hypothesised that if policy applies to group activity as follows (Finlayson & Valentine, 2002):

The costs and risks of action may be too high and even physical integrity if the activity is illegal.

If there is a group formed to defend the interests of the individual, the individual has the perception that their particular contribution may be dispensable.

If the group gets nothing the involved will be for nothing, and if on the contrary the group gets benefits, which have not been involved also share collective gain but without taking risks.

This logic applies especially to the collective assets of the community is not divisible by individuals. Based on these considerations, Olson argued that most people will choose to be freeloaders or free riders, who do not participate and let ...