SOVIET AFGHAN WAR

Soviet Afghan war: Causes and Consequences

Causes and Consequences of Soviet Afghan War

Introduction

Initially, since it was winter, there was little active opposition to the 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. However, February 1980 saw considerable unrest and it was soon clear that foreign invasion had increased the unpopularity of the Marxist regime in Kabul. The Afghan army, reduced by desertions to 30,000 men, could no longer keep order and the Soviets, like the Americans in Vietnam fifteen years earlier, were forced to protect the unpopular government themselves. However Soviet involvement never matched the scale of involvement attained by the US in Vietnam. About 85,000 Red Army troops were deployed in spring 1980 and in 1988 there were 105,000 there. This paper discusses the causes and consequences of Soviet Afghan war.

Discussion

The peak commitment in the early 1980s seems to have been 110,000. Their opponents were the Mujahedin (soldiers of the jihad), some of whom had been fighting against Communism since before the Soviet intervention. They were divided into numerous groups, some of whom even fought each other, largely because of tribal differences. The government, which itself remained divided between Parcham and Khalq political factions, was able to exploit tribal differences to stay in power. It also used police-state methods and Marxist indoctrination, and tried to woo key groups like religious leaders and businessmen. The government held the capital, Kabul, other major cities, and some provinces.

The Red Army tried to end Mujahedin activity with 'sweep offensives' at first, but conventional tactics were useless against determined, mountain-based guerrilla fighters. Thus the tactics changed to the use of air power (to pin down the guerrillas), counter-insurgency operations and the use of blatant terrorism (including aerial bombing and mine-laying) against the population. This led to high civilian casualties, flights of refugees to Pakistan and Iran, and greater unpopularity for the government. US aid to the Mujahedin increased under Ronald Reagan. It was channelled by the CIA via Pakistan and China (and even, it seems, Iran in 1986), and eventually included 'Stinger' anti-aircraft missiles in 1985-86, which proved a major blow to the Soviets. (Bergen 2001)

Peace efforts by UN envoys Perez de Cuellar and (after the latter's promotion to UN Secretary-General) Diego Cordovez brought Afghanistan and Pakistan in June 1982 into 'proximity talks', so called because the two sides did not meet face-to-face until 1988. The Geneva-based talks began to make real progress ...