Socrates, Pleasure, and Value

Introduction

Anyone who has worked on Socratic ethics and eudaemonism in latest years is cognizant of Rudebusch's work in the area. In a number of items, he has assisted to clarify Platonic arguments and our own thinking. This publication is substantially founded on these items, but this does not devalue the enterprise at all. It is useful to have the work gathered simultaneously, and it is useful to have the connections between the various items conveyed, so that they turn into a coherent book. In supplement, of course, the publication comprises some new work.

The centered issue of the publication is the vintage chestnut of the relative between the clear-cut hedonism of Protagoras and the clear-cut anti-hedonism of Gorgias. There have been a number of endeavours to contend that the two dialogues are matching, and Rudebusch's is one of the best. He contends against the Gosling/Taylor distinction (which furthermore serves to reconcile the two dialogues) between long-term and short-term delight, in favour of a distinction between Calliclean hedonism as privileging apparent pleasantness, and Socratic hedonism as a hedonism of assess that permits one to differentiate genuine from clear-cut pleasantness. In Rudebusch's terms, Callicles' hedonism is a approval hedonism of sensed yearn, while Socrates' hedonism is a approval hedonism of factual desire.

Book Analysis

The contention with Callicles is set in context by chapter 3, a consideration of Polus's position. Iam solely in agreement with Rudebusch's consideration here. He demonstrates that Polus is what he calls an 'ethical Protagorean', such that he retains two theses: '(1) For any activity or object, insofar as it seems to be desirable for me, it actually is attractive for me; (2) For any psychological state of brain, insofar as it appears to be a state of yearning, it actually is that state of desiring.' In order to refute Polus, Rudebusch argues, Socrates gets him to accept two distinctions: first, that some things, like health, are intrinsically desirable, while other things, like drinking foul-tasting surgery, are only extrinsically desirable; and, second (as also stressed by Penner in Apeiron 24 (1991)), that since some extrinsically attractive things may furthermore on occasion be extrinsically unattractive, we do not want them unconditionally, but only if they are actually beneficial (i.e. extrinsically desirable); if, on the other hand, they turn out to be hurtful (i.e. extrinsically undesirable), we desire not to do them. This is a distinction between dependent and undependent yearning, such that if the apparent good is in detail for the good, then we desire it; if it is not for the good, then we do not yearn it. This groups the context for the subsequent consideration with Callicles, in the sense that there is a loophole in Socrates' refutation of Polus, which is plugged by Callicles. Anything that directly satisfies yearn can be glimpsed as both intrinsically and unconditionally attractive to a Calliclean hedonist.

In section 4 Rudebusch turns to define Callicles' position. It is clear that Callicles is far from being what he calls a 'prudential hedonist'. It is ...