SEPARATE BUT EQUAL

Civil Rights The Separate But Equal Doctrine



Civil Rights The Separate But Equal Doctrine

Introduction

Separate but identical doctrine derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Plessyv. Ferguson (1896), that state-mandated separation of the races in public transportation does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment ban on involuntary servitude, or the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process clauses so long as conditions are created for segregation of races were equal.

Discussion

In Plessy, all judges to keep John Marshall Harlan assumed that the custom of segregation was so well established in the South and is very beneficial to both races, it did not create stigma in itself (see segregation, de jure). Referring to decisions in cases of interstate transportation, in which the court found that Louisiana could not prevent the segregation of races in interstate travel (Hall B. Decuir, 1878), but Mississippi could be separated from the race in the intrastate carriers (Louisville, New Orleans and Texas Railway Co. V. Mississippi, 1890), referee HenryB. *Brown ruled that "laws allowing and even needing the separation of ... [races] in places where they are liable to lead to a contact, does not necessarily mean inferior any race for others, and were generally if not universally, recognized as within the purview of state legislatures in the exercise of their police officers (Barbour's plan, 2009).

Another reason for the inconclusive nature of the history of the amendment on school segregation, the status of public education at that time. In the South, the movement toward free schools supported by general taxation, had not yet captured. Education white children primarily in the hands of private groups. Blacks are almost no education and almost all the races were illiterate. In detail, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast, many of the negros have ...