POLITICAL THEORY

Political theory

Political theory

The first rule of priority (Priority of Liberty) John Rawls states: "The principles of justice should be ranked in lexical order and therefore, the fundamental freedom may be restricted only for the sake of freedom." Fundamental freedoms of those who usually protected constitutional regimes, including the "freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of man..., The right to hold private property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure...." (P. 53). Priority of Liberty examines these liberties are of paramount importance, and prohibits their sacrifices for the sake of efficiency, utilitarian and perfectionist ideals, or even other principles in the framework of justice as fairness (eg, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle). Priority of Liberty has always played a central role in the political theory of Rawls. Rawls himself remarks that "the power of fairness as fairness, seems to arise from two things: the obligation that all inequalities be supported to the smallest advantaged, and the priority of liberty.

This pair of constraints distinguishes it from intuitionism and teleological theory "(p. 220). As we shall see, its value in his work, if anything increased over time. One reason for this greater attention to increasing ambivalence about Rawls other distinctive elements ofhis political theory, especially the lexical priority of fair equality of opportunity and Principle.2 difference in the absence of the former element, the priority of liberty would be the only warning of a special conception of justice from a collapse in the general concept, where all social primary goods (and, presumably, whose interests they support) are combined. Rawls is deeply opposed, however, that "all human interests are commensurable, and that between any two there is always some exchange rate in terms of which it is expedient to balance the protection of one against the protection of others. Any other lexical main concern to the rudimentary freedoms to face this trade-offs in certain circumstances. This is the central component of justice as fairness has been criticized in a long line of articles, including Brian Barry, Kenneth Arrow, HLA Hart, Russell and Keith David Miller, Henry Shu, Joseph Marco, Samuel Richmond, Ricardo Blaug, and Norman Daniels. All these authors found a defense Rawls on the priority of Liberty wanting in some respects, many of whom have been sharply critical of the idea of lexical priority to the basic liberties: Brian Barry believes that " bizarre extreme ", while HLA Hart considers a" dogmatic. "I'll gaze at Rawls three contentions for the main concern of Liberty Theory of fairness and display that the two of them actually go wrong (in entire or in part) due to a common error: Rawls on belief that as shortly as he has shown the instrumental worth of the basic freedoms forsome major purpose (for demonstration, providing self-esteem), it automatically shows the causes of their lexical priority.

I will continue to refer to this belief that the lexical priority of basic liberties can be inferred from a ...