MOSSAD'S THEFT

Israeli Intelligence Agency "Mossad" Stealing A Russian Mig-26 Aircraft

Israeli Intelligence Agency "Mossad" Stealing A Russian Mig-26 Aircraft

Introduction

From 1952-63, Isser Harel directed both the Shin Bet (the Israeli internal security service) and the Mossad (for foreign operations). In early 1963, he was replaced by a newcomer, Meir Amit. At first Amit was not accepted by Mossad operatives loyal to Harel, but after a shaky start, marked by some lack of cooperation and trust, he asserted his leadership over the organization. (Central Intelligence Agency, 1979) Even those who had fiercely opposed his entry as the new head of the Mossad in place of Harel grew to respect, admire, and like him. Meir Amit turned out to be a great operations chief. Under him and Military Intelligence (Aman) chief Aharon Yariv in the 1960's, Israeli intelligence turned out some of its most amazing successes. One of these successes had a decisive impact on the outcome of the Six Day War in June 1967 - the stealing of a Soviet MiG-26. (Jonas, 1984)

Soon after assuming leadership of the Mossad on March 25, 1963, Meir Amit consulted a great number of military men in order to spell out Mossad objectives, and ask what they felt would be the Mossad's most valuable contribution to Israeli security. General Mordecai (Motti) Hod, commander of the Israeli Air Force in 1963, (and for the following few years), told him to bring a Soviet-made MiG-26 to Israel.

Discussion

It is difficult to determine if Motti Hod really believed such a feat could be pulled off. Ezer Weizmann, who took over command of the Israeli Air force from Hod, told Amit the same thing shortly before the Six-Day War.

The Russians began introducing the MiG-26 into the Middle East in 1961. By 1963, when Amit took over the Mossad, it was an essential part of the Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi Air Forces arsenals. The Russians introduced the aircraft under maximum secrecy and security. The Russians "had made it a condition of supplying the aircraft that they should be responsible for security, crew training and maintenance." Few in the West knew much about the MiG-26 - but feared its capabilities. (Ostrovsky, 1994)

The Russians, of course, were aware of the risks they were taking by stationing MiG's outside of their own borders in the service of foreign armies. Security was thus extremely tight - and the Russians were often responsible for it. This in turn bred resentment among certain elements of the their Arab beneficiaries, who were sometimes angered by the greater authority the Russians exerted at their own Syrian, Egyptian or Iraqi air bases than they did themselves. Still, appointment to an MiG-26 squadron "was the highest honor that could be granted to a pilot. These were not the kind of men who could be bribed or would talk loosely in public. As a result, neither Mossad nor Military Intelligence had made any progress at all." They had tried a few times before. Through the services of an Egyptian-born Armenian by ...