IMF and Russia in 1990s

Introduction

The subject of this paper may seem to have been discussed too much in the past and it might be assumed that people would not be interested in such matters any more. However, 1 do not think that this issue has been studied satisfactorily. 1 would like to emphasize two problems in the discussions of the last ten years. The first problem is that we do not know what the 1MF demanded from Russia in detail. The discussions have been conducted around vague images of the so-called “Washington consensus.” The second problem is that the 1MF has been criticized in a confusing way. in fact there have been two directions of criticisms of the iMF. On the one hand, the 1MF has been criticized for compelling Russia to take monotonous neo-liberal measures without considering the specific historical and social features of Russia. On the other hand, it is criticized for failing to pursue the consistent “right” liberal policies under the political pressure of Russia.' Curiously both types of criticisms are sometimes unconsciously employed at the same time. These are the problems for which we have not yet reached answers.

Analysis

By examining the contents of the statements or memoranda, we realize that the three groups of the assignments had been touched on at the same time from the beginning. For example, the Memorandum for the first program of 1992 referred to all the items in the liberalization group and included several items in the stabilization and structural reform groups. We can consider this as an apparent expression of the so-called “big-bang” approach of the IIVIF (Tabata, 10-627). Camdessus said in the above-mentioned statement, “First, and most important, the most appropriate course of action is to adopt bold strategy. Many countries, including countries of the former Soviet Union, have by now proven the feasibility of implementing policies of rapid liberalization, stabilization and structural reform. The fact of the matter is that gradualism has not been found to be an effective presentation in any of the three major policy areas” (Camdessus, 19-294). However we must note that everything cannot be done at the same time in this world. Therefore, as a matter of fact, the emphasis is to be shifted form one field of policy to another “gradually.” As for the three groups of the policy assignments above, liberalization is easy to accomplish because it could be done only by lifting old restrictive legislation, whereas structural reforms need long-term mechanism design.

in April 1996, Camdessus made an address at the U.S.- Russia Business Council in which he emphasized the importance of three tasks at the beginning of the three-year iMF program for Russia (Camdessus, 15-196). The three tasks that Camdessus mentioned were furthering deduction in inflation, building up efficient institutions and effective policy tools, and accelerating structural reform. He also touched on the problems of energy taxation, liberal trade regime, land registration, legal framework for full privatization, social protection programs, etc. in short, Camdessus thought that the tasks of the ...