Free Will and Determinism



Free Will and Determinism

Introduction

The accepted analysis of about the concept of a person, which the philosophers have accepted lately, is not the real analysis of that concept The current standard of Strawson, reveals the concept of a person as, the idea of a form of entity such that the basic imputing physical characteristics and the basic imputing states of consciousness, both are equally appropriate for a single person belonging to that single form. However, apart from people, there are many other entities which exhibit physical and psychological properties. Although it appears to be exceptional that this should happen, there is no available word in the English Dictionary which provides a name to the form of entity which Strawson has in his mind. The form which not only include human beings, but, animals of various species, as well. This, however, does not justify the deceit of a worthwhile term of philosophy.

The process of determining whether some species of animals are person is not merely dependent on the basic imputing physical characteristics and the basic imputing states of consciousness. Referring these creatures with the term person leads to violence of our language. The creatures, which despite of exhibiting physical and psychological characteristics, can never be considered as persons in any sane logic of the world. Therefore, this misuse of language is above suspicion of any theoretical error, without any shadows of doubt. There exists a logic according to which a person is considered to be a singular form of people. Both of these terms, have a connotation of having membership of the biological species. However, in those logics which hold greater philosophical interest, the criterion of being a person is solely linked to differentiate the members of our species from those of the others (Leher, 1966).

Instead, they are developed to grab those attributes which are the area of main concern for our humane selves, Moreover, they are also the source of what appears to be the most problematic and most significant in or lives. These characteristics would hold the same significance for us, even if they do not seem strange or are common in other members of our species. Also, things that attract us in human condition would be of equal interest, if they were feature of other creatures living in the similar condition.

Discussion

Apart from being stirred to do or not to do something, choosing or wanting thins, there are various instances where men want to have or not to have few motives and desires. They have the ability of wanting to be distinguished in their determination and requirements. Likewise a number of animals have the ability to have what we shall call first order desires which are merely the needs of doing or not doing something. No animal expect for man, apparently have the ability to do a self-evaluation which is showed in the form of having second order desires. For instance, consider a man who wants to be driven in what he attempts to ...