DISVISIBILITY ARGUEMENT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Divisibility Argument

 

 

 

 

 

 

Divisibility Argument

Introduction

This paper will talk about the dualism's Divisibility Argument. This contention relies on Leibniz's Law and values a distinct house to verify the distinctness of mind states of mental states. Mary, who is a materialist, presents some objections to that argument. Her major objection corresponds to the first/third-person approach. She accepts as factual that Dave presents that argument only from the first-person approach, which is introspection, and completely disregards the third-person approach, which is fact of another mind. Mary's objections will pursue by the Dave's answer on them from the dualist's issue of view. (Rene, 1991, 28)The reason of the Divisibility Argument is to verify that mental states are distinct from the mind states. My body, which encompasses my mind, is divisible. However, I will not conceive of my mind as divisible. Therefore, my mind is distinct from any part of my body. (Rene, 1991, 28)

Discussion

Descartes was the first who established the Divisibility Argument. He held that the two constituents which constitute man had an independent source and is of a fundamentally distinct nature. The body is divisible, since it can be divided for demonstration, my leg or my hand can be slash off; my mind can be slash on half. However, the concept of the divisible mind is inconceivable.

This argument relies on the Leibniz's Law. It is a standard about persona, which states, “If an object or happening X is equal with an object or happening Y, then X and Y have all of the identical properties.” So if X and Y have any distinct properties, then X cannot be equal with Y. Divisibility Argument values a distinct house to verify the distinctness of mind states and mental states: the house of being indivisible. In this case, the mind has a house and mind needs ...