DIALOGIC ETHICS

Situating a Dialogic Ethics: A Dialogic Confession



Abstract

In this paper, the chapter “Situating a Dialogic Ethics: A Dialogic Confession,” of the book “The Handbook of Communication Ethics” has been critically examined. The paper explores the concepts used by the author and the ethics involved in the dialog.

Situating a Dialogic Ethics: A Dialogic Confession

Introduction

The book, “The Handbook of Communication Ethics” provides a complete guide to the ethics and communication study. It brings together applications and analyses based on documented theories of ethics as well as those outside the conventional ethical domains but which engages significant questions of justice, power, and equality.

In the fourth chapter of the book, “Situating a Dialogic Ethics: A Dialogic Confession,” the author explored the relationship between communication ethics and dialogue from several view points. The author communicates that there are various historical theories and scholarly approaches to communications ethics and dialogue, which he proceeds to explore with the reader. The author explains in detail about the dialogic ethics in this chapter. This paper critically examines the theories and concepts the author used in this chapter.

Discussion

In this chapter, the author describes that dialogic ethics receive increasing attention as an approach to global ethics. The particular strength of any dialogic ethics lies in their post-metaphysical, immanent and practical foundation on the normative powers of dialogue. However, it seems that for this very reason, dialogic ethics is badly suited for any kind of normative theorizing or practical advice in regard to security issues. On the one hand, questions of security emerge where dialogue - while very often still desirable - stops being a reasonable option (Horwitz, 1978). On the other hand, reframing problems of security as problems of dialogue might be dangerously naïve or outright cynical: At least in international politics we can think of many situations in which dialogue is not a morally responsible choice anymore. Does that mean that the question of security constitutes the limit of dialogic ethics? Is it just a fair-weather approach for consolidated liberal democratic societies (the context for which it has been developed)? Does it not become self-referential when we need a dialogue to determine how conditions for dialogue should be created? Could it conceive of security questions theoretically and include the dialogue adverse realm of security issues in its normative-practical portfolio?

While dialogic ethicists have thought about these questions and did not refrain from making practical suggestions in concrete cases either (e.g. Habermas), they therefore also were target of much criticism (Horwitz, 1978). But as an approach to global ethics, dialogic cosmopolitanism ultimately remains unconvincing without sound answers to security questions.

The author has also described different forms of ethics,

Democratic ethics - each person's voice counts and has a right to be heard

A universal ethic - each person has basic inalienable rights, no matter status or position

Contextual ethics - textured response to the universal perspective Ethical codes and procedures - both a universal component and a core focused on organization

Narrative ethic - "the notion that ...