COVERT ACTION AND BLOWBACK

Covert Action and Blowback

Covert Action and Blowback

Why 9/11?

In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, U.S. leadership, pundits, and lay people all sought to understand one overriding question—why? Why would anyone want to attack the global bastion of freedom and democracy? The question of why raises the troubling notion that this act of terror, while inexcusable and murderous, is a conundrum with logical answers.

Though most speculation included the notion that the Islamic fundamentalists' hatred towards Western society fueled the terrorism, a few theories postulated that the U.S. was in fact responsible, at least in part, for the tragic attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Towers (Skaine 2002). To better judge U.S. culpability for the September 11th attacks, it is important first to understand the history of the Soviet/Afghan War, which led to U.S. involvement in the region.

Soviet / Afghan War

The Soviets sent thousands of troops at the invitation of the Afghan Communist regime for what was thought to be a neat surgical military operation (Gannon 1998). The Soviets had hoped the invasion would not only shore up the Afghan communists' rule, but that it would also secure their southern border, root out Islamic fundamentalism sparked by Iran and Pakistan, and consolidate Communist rule in the Central Asian States.

U.S. Strategy

Carter Reacts

On a personal level, President Carter was violently opposed to the invasion because he viewed the operation as, “the greatest threat to peace since the second world war.” A take-over of Afghanistan would mean a foothold in the Middle East along with access and potential control over the oil fields in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, the Soviets could possibly control movement through key waterways in the region through which most of the world's oil had to pass. President Carter's reluctance to provide the rebels weapons would soon change

Covert Action

Rationalizing that a Soviet withdrawal would better serve his policy of detente, the President stated that the purpose of the covert action was solely to harass—not to defeat—the Soviets (Armstrong 2007). Because three of these countries were enemies of the West, the U.S. was forced to strike a deal with Pakistan to establish a supply line to the rebels. The U.S. was anxious to secure the agreement not only for the covert action, but to reassure itself that Pakistan would be a strategic buffer between the Soviet Union and China.

Zia did not want to be seen as a U.S. pawn, nor did he want convey the perception that his administration was facilitating the battle over a fellow Muslim country by the world's two super powers. Pakistan had two conditions for their involvement: (1) No U.S. personnel were allowed in Afghanistan; and (2) Pakistan's intelligence service (ISI) would control the supply line to mujahideen and decide who received the U.S. supplied weapons.

The Plan

To maintain plausible deniability of U.S. involvement, the CIA could not supply the rebels with American weapons. Instead, weapons for the Afghan mujahideen were bought with ...