Counterinsurgency Principles for Contemporary Internal Conflict

By

Table of Contents

Introduction1

Research Problem and Question1

Origin of the conflict2

Discussion4

Tactics And Strategies Adopted by LTTE6

Kidnapping6

Sucicide attacks7

Targets8

Assassinations of High-Level Leaders by the LTTE9

Battles of Eelam War12

Winning COIN strategies: the Sri Lanka scenario14

Government Legitimacy14

Unity of Effort15

Political Primacy in Counterinsurgency Strategy15

Security under the Rule of Law16

Extent of External Support for the State17

Ability to Reduce External Support to the Insurgent17

Conclusion18

Recommendation19

Endnotes20

Introduction

For almost a quarter of a century, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an insurgent group of about 3,000-7,000 members, has fought the Sri Lankan military to a stalemate. In the meantime, the Tigers have exerted near exclusive control over most of the country's northern provinces, as well as large parts of the eastern hinterland. They have done so with a fraction of the government's resources and personnel. The LTTE has survived numerous offensives by the state's armed forces over the years, often abandoning huge swathes of territory only to retake them later in swift campaigns of incredible boldness and sophistication. Sri Lanka's leaders have discovered time and again that they can take key areas through concentrated attacks, but rarely hold them for long before the Tigers strike back at the Army's most vulnerable positions, forcing yet another humiliating retreat. According to some military commanders, the Army does not have anywhere near the personnel required to defend every base, camp, and convoy against a concentrated LTTE offensive. As a result, the military tends to make quick territorial gains, only to see its forces become increasingly spread thin, and then routed with a series of concentrated attacks on isolated positions one after another. Even in "cleared areas", insurgents continue to operate, carrying out attacks on interior lines and influencing the behavior of civilians in government-controlled terrain.

Research Problem and Question

The existing counter insurgency principles formulated long time back and those were formulated on experience gain by the British forces (External Force) fighting with the Malayan insurgents. In this circumstance, the researcher wanted to examine and find out how far these existing principles relevant and applicable when an internal legal force fight against contemporary insurgents paying attention to the Sri Lankan victory against LTTE (once rated as world number one terrorist organization). In this context, this thesis will strive to answer the questions:

What enabled Sri Lanka to succeed in Elam War IV?

What were the critical differences from the three previous phases?

What explains Sri Lanka's success after two decades of failure?

In answering these questions, this study attempts to address lessons learned from Sri Lanka and how those lessons might compel us to reassess existing counterinsurgency doctrines.

Origin of the conflict

There are several other ways of explaining the Tigers' ability to hold their own against the Sri Lankan military. Commentators often point to the group's popularity among Tamils, its extraordinary wealth and access to vast quantities of sophisticated weapons, or the Tigers' unmatched intelligence network. Each argument points to an important advantage held by the LTTE, yet these theories tell us little about the group's strategic ...