The purpose of this paper is to critically reconsider the mortgage lending value (MLV) and to acclimatize it in alignment to find a new concept that could assist as the cornerstone for an internationally acknowledged standard for valuations for lending purposes.
Table of Contents
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION1
Introduction Overview1
Research Statement2
Research Aims and Objectives3
Nature of the Study4
Significance of the Study4
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW6
Introduction6
Literature on consumer mortgage choice11
Introduction to the HSBC Case14
HSBC: The Bearish Case14
General business, economic, political and market conditions14
Federal and state regulation15
Competition15
Operational risks16
Liquidity17
Summary to the HSBC Case17
Citi Group Case20
Re-Default Rates21
Foreclosures22
Capital market regulations and executive compensations22
Growth of credit default swaps24
Flawed economic models and borrowing rating28
High financial leverage and bank run30
Stock market volatility31
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY36
Methodological approach36
Choice of variables36
DATA COLLECTION:37
Survey instrument37
Example of conjoint instrument item37
Philosopy Methods38
Choice Justification38
Reliability and Limitation38
Design/methodology/Sampling39
Findings40
Ethical Issues41
CHAPTER 04: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS42
Consumer lending and mortgage lending's within the banks portfolio42
Factors that have influenced the operations to consumer and mortgage lendings42
Critical success factors for the concept of MLV43
Problems faced by banks and other lending institutions, enagaged in consumer lending mortgages44
Rationale need for risk assessment particularly credit risk and lose provisions44
Did these banks dealt with capital adequacy in according with the regulatory body monitoring system46
Work attempted for the study inquiry, objective46
Outcome for the study inquiry, objective, objective.47
Ability to deal with study problem47
CHAPTER 05: CONCLUSION49
REFERENCES51
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Introduction Overview
Recent outbreaks of financial crises and the tendency of financial liberalization have stimulated much concern in revising the connection between the two. One anxious topic is the impact of intensified affray that arises from eliminating bank entry restrictions. Most of the theoretical publications concludes that affray rises banks' credit risk. A widespread contention is that affray drives down lend rates and bank profits, reducing banks' incentives to computer display loan applicants, leading to alleviated lending criteria and expanded bank failures. It is furthermore contended that affray decreases banks' screening proficiency by worsening the pool of loan applicants. In compare, contend that loan screening assists alleviate comparable force, and therefore intenser affray can stimulate screening activities. Likewise, (Chen 05) considers a bank's alternative between loan screening and collateral obligations, and concludes that it is more probable to select the previous other than depend on the last cited when opposite comparable force from a promise entrant.
Empirically, outcomes in the associated publications are no less mixed. (Gruben et al. 02) find clues of a affirmative connection between financial liberalization and financial crises. (Gropp and Vesala 04) resolve that financial liberalization tends to smaller bank asset quality. However, and find advanced bank performance after banking deregulation in the Untied States, and Turkey, respectively; and (Caminal and Matutes 02) manage not find a clear connection between market power and bank failures.
Since 2001, there has been an upward trend in swinging of housing market while the falling of interest rates and the rising availability of mortgages combined with rising housing prices. The Federal Reserve (Fed) has direct control over two types of interest rate. The first, called the discount rate, is a rate charged by the Fed to banks for borrowing ...