The most noteworthy aspect of Al Qaeda in the post 9-11 environment has been its broadened appeal among the Muslim community. Its ideology and operational methodology of suicide (martyrdom) has become popular, widespread and accepted by like-minded jihad groups from Australia to Chechnya and Canada. Al Qaeda has maintained its course despite sustained pressure by the US and its allies. Al Qaeda's resilience, intransigence, and its failure to yield have surprised many. Al Qaeda has become even more committed in its jihad campaign (holy war). It has become more resolute in achieving its strategic goals.
How did the American intelligence agencies react to the development of the threat of Islamic terrorism before 9/11? How has its approach altered in the years since the attacks?
In the face of adversity, Al Qaeda has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to integrate disparate jihadist groups into a post-9/11 vision of perpetual war against the West. The UK arrests in the first week of August 2006 demonstrate the adaptive nature of the group. It no longer needs to send operatives from Afghanistan, but there are young first and second generation politicized and radicalized Muslims living in the West willing to carry out its avowed mission. Even if Al Qaeda leadership is hunted down and the group destroyed, its mission of attacking the West articulated by bin Laden as a religious duty and popularized by Al Qaeda will continue.
Struck by the horror of 9-11 the world community supported a US-led global campaign to dismantle Jamiat al-Qaida al-Jihad, the secret group responsible for attacking the United States. Al Qaeda has suffered severely during the last five years, but its leadership - bin Laden and Dr Ayman al Zawahiri - are still alive. These icons of terror are inspiring and instigating a global jihad against the US, its Allies and its friends. Five years after 9-11, we face a greater threat than at 9-11. What are the successes and failures of that campaign?
Three significant developments mark the post 9-11 threat environment.
First, the dismantling of a state-of-the-art terrorist and guerrilla training and operational infrastructure in Afghanistan.
Second, dispersal of Al Qaeda, diffusion of the threat, and formation of a multi-headed global jihad movement that is resilient and difficult to combat.
Third, the emergence of Afghanistan and Iraq, as two frontiers of jihad, with the potential to inflict a strategic defeat against the United States, its Allies and friends.
Afghanistan was the base of training and operations for Al Qaeda even before its formation in 1988. In its previous life, Al Qaeda operated as Maktab-il-khidamat (est. 1984), the Arab group spearheading the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The loss of training camps in Afghanistan was a significant blow not only to Al Qaeda but also to multiple groups that relied on Afghanistan for training. Since the US-led coalition forces targeted the camps of Al Qaeda, Taliban and other foreign groups in Afghanistan, it has made it much harder for the ...