Personal Identity

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PERSONAL IDENTITY

Personal Identity

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction3

Background of the study3

Purpose of the study11

Rationale of the study11

Chapter 2: Literature Review12

Chapter 3: Methodology26

Research Design26

Literature Search26

Keywords27

Chapter 4: Discussion28

Criteria of Identity31

Chapter 5: Conclusion35

References38

Bibliography58

Chapter 1: Introduction

Background of the study

Parfit propounds a reductionist account of personal identity, somewhat like the Buddhist no-self view. Appealing to a dazzling array of so-called puzzle cases involving hypothetical fission, fusion, and branch lines of different selves or person-stages, Parfit challenges widely held beliefs about the nature and importance of personal identity. Most assume that there is a deep, further fact that constitutes personal identity, a fact that must be all or nothing and that matters greatly in rational and moral deliberations.

As a number of philosophers have remarked, one of the many puzzles about identity, given its apparent simplicity, is why it proves so puzzling. Indeed, one pervasive sentiment is that identity cannot pose any philosophical problems. Anything that looks like a problem about identity must really be a problem about something else. Derek Parfit is senior research fellow of All Souls College; a regular visiting professor at Harvard, New York University, and Rutgers; and a fellow of both the British Academy and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Parfit discusses the ways in which theories about morality and rationality can be self-defeating and also makes claims about rational irrationality, blameless wrongdoing, imperceptible harms and benefits, harmless torturers, and other mistakes in moral mathematics.

Despite that, problems about identity appear to play a central role in a large number of philosophical issues whose discussion dates back to the ancient world. One of the most venerable concerns identity and change. Things change, but remain the same. The same poker is at one time hot, another time cold. How can something be both identical and different from one time to another? At first sight this problem evaporates once we draw the time honored distinction between numerical and qualitative identity. To say that a and b are qualitatively identical is to say is to say that a exactly resembles b. To say that a and b are numerically identical is, at least, to say a and b are one thing and not two. Whether a and b can have all their qualities in common without being numerically identical is controversial. Nevertheless, it seems that a and b can be numerically identical without being qualitatively identical by having different qualities at different times.

Some find problematic the very same thing having different properties at different times (see the problem of temporary intrinsics discussed below). Setting that general problem aside, there are special cases of it that generate some of the most intractable issues about identity. One results from persisting things putatively having different parts at different times. Consider an object capable of changing its parts, such as a cup at a time when its handle is still attached. At that time the cup appears to consist of the following two parts: a smaller one, its handle, together with a larger one consisting of the rest ...
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