Perceptual Entitlement

Perceptual Entitlement

The Epistemic Value of Tyler Burge's Conception of Perceptual Entitlement

Introduction

Tyler Burge (1993) defends an original account of testimonial knowledge and its relationship to a priori knowledge. The originality of the account is due, in part, to the fact that it is cast within a novel epistemic framework. The central feature of the framework is the introduction of the concept of entitlement, which is alleged to be a distinctive type of positive epistemic support or warrant. In a later paper, Burge (2003, 504, n.1) maintains that entitlement and justification are sub-species of warrant, and offers the following characterization of the difference between them: justification is “the internalist form of warrant,” but entitlement is “epistemically externalist.” The term 'entitlement' has gained wider currency in the epistemological literature, especially in discussions of the a priori. But, as Burge 1 e himself (2003, 504, n.1) notes, it is used to refer to a wide range of different epistemic notions. My focus in this paper is Burge's conception of entitlement and there are three primary issues that I wish to address. What is the relationship between entitlement and the more traditional concept of justification? In what sense is entitlement epistemically externalist? Has Burge introduced a new epistemic concept or merely coined a new term for a familiar epistemic concept?

Justification and entitlement

Burge (1993, 458) introduces the distinction between justification and entitlement in the following passage: Although both have positive force in rationally supporting a propositional attitude or cognitive practice, and in constituting an epistemic right to it, entitlements are epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even accessible to the subject.

Justification and entitlement have some common features:

(C1) Both have positive force in rationally supporting beliefs; and

(C2) Both are epistemic rights or warrants.

There are also important differences between them. Burge stresses two features of entitlements:

(E1) Entitlements need not be understood by the subject.

(E2) Entitlements need not be accessible to the subject.

Burge (1993, 458-459) goes on to elaborate the differences between justification and entitlement: We are entitled to rely, other things equal, on perception, memory, deductive and inductive reasoning, and on . . . the word of others. The unsophisticated are entitled to rely on their perceptual beliefs. Philosophers may articulate these entitlements. But being entitled does not require being able to justify reliance on these resources, or even to conceive such a justification. Justifications, in the narrow sense, involve reasons that people have and have access to. These may include self-sufficient premises or more discursive justifications. But they must be available in the cognitive repertoire of the subject.

Here Burge draws attention to two additional features of entitlements:

(E3) Being entitled to rely on a resource does not require being able to justify reliance on that resource.

(E4) Being entitled does not require being able to conceive such a justification. Burge also introduces two features of justifications:

(J1) Justifications involve reasons people have and have access to.

(J2) Justifications involve reasons that must be available within the cognitive repertoire of the ...