MYTH OF GYGES

Myth of Gyges

Myth of Gyges

Introduction

The Ring of Gyges is a mythical magical artifact mentioned by the philosopher Plato in book 2 of his Republic (2.359a-2.360d). It granted its owner the power to become invisible at will. Through the story of the ring, Republic discusses whether a typical person would be moral if he did not have to fear the consequences of his actions.

Socratic defense of Justice is not based on fear to commit, nor is it born of spite for not being him a tyrant. In this sense, Plato is not a moralistic parable. For if our honesty has no other origin than our inability to do evil with impunity, why talk about it? The following passage judges the common moral mediocrity and address the challenge of the wise power. If it really is best to be fair rather than being strong, then the magic ring that frees us from the gaze of others will not change the just man. The myth of Gyges' ring is thus, with the passage that immediately follows the general position of the problem deals with the Republic.

Description and Analysis

Well people say that committing injustice is by nature a good, and that experience is an evil, but that suffering injustice has an excess of evil over good it is to commit it. Accordingly once they are mutually inflicted injustice, and have suffered from one another, and so they have tasted one and the other, it seems beneficial to those who are capable 359 or to avoid (for them) or to side (to commit) to agree among themselves not to commit injustice, so as not to suffer. And they say it is from that moment they began to establish their own laws and conventions, and to appoint what is prescribed by law both "legal" and "right". That would be both the origin and essence of justice, which is halfway between what is best - committing injustice without being punished - and worst - suffer injustice without being able to revenge. The behavior just being in the middle between these two points, it would not b in affection as well, but what determines that a lack of power to commit injustice. For he who is capable of committing and that is really a man would never enter into an agreement with anyone to not commit or suffer injustice. Otherwise, it would be crazy. So that's the nature of justice, Socrates, that their kind, and that's where she was born, what they say (Cross, 2004).

Now that those who practice justice practice it reluctantly, for failure to commit injustice, we could perceive by thinking better if we realize the following: c we would give each of the two, the man Just as the unjust, license to do whatever he may want, then we would follow, to see where his desire grow each of them. And then "we could take the just the fact, now go in the same direction as the unjust man, driven by ...