The term “consequentialism” seems to have first been used in its present sense by G. E. M. Anscombe (1919-2001) in her 1958 article, “Modern Moral Philosophy.” It primarily refers to moral views or theories which base their evaluations of acts solely on consequences. In contemporary philosophical usage, the term is most often used to refer to “act consequentialism,” which is the view that the rightness (or obligatoriness) of an act depends on whether its consequences are at least as good as (or better than) those of any alternative act available to the agent. (Some deontological views give moral weight to consequences but allow that other factors may outweigh the goodness or badness of consequences.)
The term “deontology” is a modern combination of Classical Greek terms, and means the study or science (logos) of duty, or more precisely, of what one ought to do (deon). In contemporary moral philosophy, “deontology” is used most commonly to refer to moral conceptions which endorse several theses regarding the nature of duty (the right), the nature of value (the good), and the relationship between the primary ethical concepts of the right and the good (Mearsheimer, 2001).
If the complete good cannot be described without referring to antecedent moral principles, then basic moral principles cannot be defined, as consequentialists contend, simply in terms of what maximizes the good. For prior moral prin-395 ciples are already implicit in the good, and stand in need of a different (nonmaximizing) specification and justification. This indicates a flaw in so-called rights-consequentialism as a moral conception, which holds that it is right to maximize respect for persons and their rights, and/or minimize violations of rights (the implication being that we are obligated to violate the rights of the few whenever this leads to greater respect for others' rights).
While a moral conception might incorporate this as a subordinate consequentialist principle, it is difficult to see how a moral conception could coherently have this maximizing norm as a basic principle. For prior nonmaximizing moral principles, which specify people's rights and imply duties of respect, are already part of the maximand that is to be promoted (Mearsheimer, 2001).
B ) Greene's account of moral intuition and judgment.
According to Greene dual-process model, moral judgments are driven by both intuitive emotional responses and controlled cognitive responses. This model differs from the SIM in two critical ways. First, it emphasizes the role of rule-based, controlled cognitive processes, especially the conscious application of utilitarian moral principles. Second, it allows that social influence may occur when people directly engage one another's capacities for moral reasoning, that is, the conscious evaluation of moral judgments / behaviors for their consistency with moral principles and other moral commitments.
Greene explains that Ethical intuitionism (or intuitionalism, also known as moral intuitionism) is the doctrine that ethical beliefs can be justified noninferentially through intuition. It designates those philosophical systems that consider intuition as our fundamental moral basis.
Intuition is both a psychological and a philosophical construct signifying knowledge ...