Mayaguez Incident



Mayaguez Incident

Introduction

From 12th to 15th May 1975, the United States was involved in a hostage situation and rescue operation with a government with which it had no diplomatic relations. The Mayaguez crisis nearly resulted in the annihilation of part of the rescue force and tested the presidency of Gerald Ford in the wake of U.S. failures in Southeast Asia. The Ford administration believed it had to demonstrate U.S. resolve and strength to both allies and adversaries. Although some have forgotten the seizure of the SS Mayaguez, author Robert Mahoney demonstrates in “The Mayaguez Incident” that the lessons learned from this crisis are as pertinent today as they were decades ago. Mahoney convincingly argues that the historical record on the Mayaguez is incomplete and that the crisis was a landmark event in that it tested the 1973 War Powers Act, exposed weaknesses in the U.S. ability to plan and conduct Joint operations, and was one of the first occasions where a strategic leader could speak directly to commanders on the battlefield. The author states his work is a small step toward expanding scholarly understanding of the Mayaguez crisis in the broader context of the Cold War and correcting its treatment as a footnote for those who fought and died for their country in the rescue operation. He succeeds brilliantly on both accounts. Therefore, all the issues related to Mayaguez Incident that occurred in 1975 will be discussed in detail.

Overview of the topic

The author's research also provides new insight into the crisis. The book adds much to the understanding of the events. It ties together, for the first time, the strategic, operational, and tactical events and puts them into the larger context. It clearly portrays the complexity of decision making and why problems in crisis planning and execution can easily occur. Although often assessed as an intelligence failure, Mahoney's analysis reveals that the intelligence community was not solely at fault. The author concludes the chain of command contributed to the operational difficulties. Mahoney proves there were sufficient intelligence estimates of the enemy strength on Koh Tang Island available prior to the operation, but the estimates were never passed along to the Marines.

Mahoney, dean of academics and deputy director at the Marine Corps War College, uses many primary sources, some recently declassified, to explore the decisions involving the Mayaguez. He states, "This work is the first that ties policy, strategy, and execution together while keeping the reader aware of the time pressures involved." The book is easy to read and the author provides clarity to simultaneous and confusing events. Mahoney does an excellent job explaining the events, putting them into context, and analyzing why a certain decision was made. His analysis is clear, logical, and easy to understand. The book's chapters are well organized and easily tie together the different levels of the story. Mahoney's research and analysis adds much to the history of this crisis. Overall, the book is an excellent study in decision making during a complex ...