In western countries, marriage is an institution for the establishment of permanent and sexually exclusive union between a man and a woman, and to assist persons to signal each other and to the outside world their desire for such an alliance. This Institute has been widely analyzed in recent years from the law and economics perspective, which regards marriage as a contract. There was a lengthy discussion about what type of contract is optimal, and the implications of different types of contracts to family behavior and divorce. However, apart from a brilliant but forgotten paper by William Bishop and a few recent articles, law and economics literature generally says nothing about the role of marriage as a signal.
The structure of this section is as follows. There is a brief consideration of the contractual cornerstone of marriage and some of the present suggestions for restructure in this area. There is a section on the role of marriage as a signal. This includes a summary of the economic theory of signaling and signaling application of the theory of marriage. The chapter concludes by examining implications for public policy in relation to cohabitation and same-sex marriages.
The original emphasis in law and economics literature on the traditional family in which the mother stays home to look after the children while the father earns money is to support his dependents. Gary Becker argued that this division of labor can be efficient because it uses the comparative advantage of partners and allows them to develop specialized skills. (Becker, 1976 and 1991), however, it can also make women particularly vulnerable to family breakdown, as her prospects of finding decent work can be poor if the relationship ends, and it is to earn a living. The purpose of the marriage contract in this context is to prevent people from the failure of a woman and forcing him to continue to support her, if he fails to do so (see Landes, 1978; Ellman, 1989). Such a mechanism is effective because it gives her the necessary security for investment in the family, becoming a specialized homemaker. Although the traditional family is not so widespread, the same questions continue to arise in most families with children. Most mothers work in our time, but many of them work only part-time and they are still vulnerable to family breakdown. It is often difficult to pass a good part-time workers full-time work and, as a consequence of the decision to work part-time work for children may be linked to substantial financial risks for women. Thus, many women still need legal protection to offset the risks associated with specialization, as well as the traditional justification for marriage remains in force, albeit with less force than in the past, when a full-time household was norm.
Raising children is not only a justification for marriage. Couples for mutual benefit from living together, including economies of scale in the use of property, financial support in difficult times, care in case of illness or infirmity, communication and regular sex ...