LAW OF INTENTION

Law of Intention

[Mnmae of the Institution]

Law of Intention

Critically assess the ways in which the judges have differentiated between the concepts of intention and motive in criminal law. In lay terms “intention” and “motive” are often employed interchangeably and without apparent distinction. This cannot be said to be so in the criminal law. Smith , commenting upon intention, states:

“It might be expected that the meaning of such a fundamental term would have been settled long ago but this is not so. The cases are inconsistent, judicial opinion has recently changed and there is still some measure of uncertainty.”

It is perhaps significant that none of the leading criminal law text books allow either intention or motive an indexed category of their own, referring the reader instead to the fundamental concept of mens rea. However, it should be noted that mens rea may not be equated with intention still less with motive. Mens rea is itself incapable of a single definition. Every crime has its own mens rea which must be ascertained from the words of the relevant statute or the appropriate case law. The term refers to that element of a criminal offence which relates to the mental state of the defendant. Different crimes require different mental states ranging from intention and knowledge to recklessness and negligence. In R v Maloney , the House of Lords made it clear that intention should in the vast majority of cases be afforded its ordinary meaning. Lord Bridge stated (at p.926):

“…when directing a jury on the mental element necessary in a crime of specific intent, the judge should avoid any elaboration or paraphrase of what is meant by intent, and leave it to the jury's good sense to decide whether the accused acted with the necessary intent…”

This has not, however, prevented the judiciary from indulging in much soul-searching over the meaning of the term. The classic case relating to the requisite intention to commit the crime of murder was for a long time Hyam v DPP in which the majority of the House of Lords held that foresight of high probability of serious bodily harm was a sufficient mens rea for murder even though such a state of mind did not even amount to an intention to cause grievous bodily harm. Thus it may be observed that so far as the requisite intention to commit murder is concerned, the mens rea - in this case “malice aforethought” - can be possessed by a defendant who does not “intend” deliberately to kill in any accepted sense of the term.

Notwithstanding the simplicity of the approach in Maloney (supra), further direction has been found to be necessary in cases in which the result was not the defendant's actual purposes even though the outcome was a highly probable consequence of his actions. Herring cites the “oft-quoted example” of the person who plants a bomb on an aeroplane hoping to destroy items which he has insured. He will not necessarily intend the death of the pilot even though this ...