LAND SYSTEM

Land System



Table of Contents

2CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW3

2.1Land system in China3

2.2The control development in China8

2.3Terrestrial UK10

2.3.1Groups of land ownership in urban10

2.3.2Home Property13

2.3.3Survival large private property13

2.3.4State land13

2.3.5Communal land14

2.4State intervention in land15

2.5Land planning system and the United Kingdom16

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Land Market and State Regulations in China: some institutional background

Land market did not exist under the planned economy. Governments at various levels expropriated land and allocated it to users (state units and stateowned enterprises) free of charge or with some symbolic fees. This system impeded efficient allocation of land in the economy. In 1987, China desperately needed foreign investments for its Shenzhen SEZ (special economic zone) and coined the new concept of land use rights. By separating use rights from ownership, pragmatic leaders effectively legitimized the transfer of land for commercial uses.

Land is now publicly owned and no private ownership is allowed. In the countryside, rural collectives own land and have the power to expropriate land for local public projects, township and village enterprises, and village housing. In urban areas, land belongs to the state. Local governments allocate land for non-commercial uses, such as school buildings, highways, railroads, etc. They may lease land for other for-profit uses. For residential land use, the lease is 70 years. The lease is shorter for industrial and commercial usages (50 and 40 years, respectively). The demand for commercial land use skyrocketed in the early 1990s. With limited supply of urban land, local governments had to expand into neighboring rural land, most of which were farm land. According to the 1998 Land Administration Law, local governments can acquire land from rural collectives on the basis of “public interest”. This concept is hard to define but the ambiguity allows local governments to bend the rules easily and convert rural land for commercial development. In fact, under the system, local state acquisition is the only legitimate means for crossing the urban/rural land divide.

Naturally, local governments have turned this monopolistic power into a revenue-generating business. The Land Administration Law stipulates that local governments must compensate rural collectives and peasants for land acquisitions based on the following: a) compensations for land (six to ten times the average annual output value of the land); b) resettlement funds (four to six times the land productivity); and c) compensations for lost crops. A policy by the Ministry of Land Resources further caps the compensation at not more than thirty times the derived land productivity. Even these moderate compensations are compromised in practice. Local governments routinely undervalued the land yield and underpay the farmers. When land is leased out in the primary market, land users must pay the expropriation fee. They also pay various stipulated land fees incurred in the transaction and a conveyance fee.

Hangzhou city, for example, paid relocated farmers about 12,000 to 30,000 Yuan per person in 2002. According to the city's own social welfare department, at least 60,000 Yuan per person was required for these people to get a minimum monthly social security payment. Disgruntled farmers brought law suits to local courts ...