Is the “Just War Theory” Relevant in the age of Global Terrorism?

Just War Theory

The theory of just war theory as intermediate between those theories and warmongering pacifist was acquitted in the history of two different functions: it has now been received to deny the validity of the first, has now been taken to deny the validity of the second. In Catholic theology, beginning with S. Augustine, the first function is fulfilled: it was time to refute the claim, attributed to the early church fathers, who for some distance and the spirit of the Gospel were to take the principle of absolute condemnation of war and that therefore every war is always illegal (Joseph, 2006, p. 388-389). In the revival of natural law after the First World War, just war theory, long abandoned, was revived to perform the opposite function: it was, this time to refute the realistic theories of history and politics that were variously exalted war and had come to the conclusion that all wars are lawful (Joseph, 2006, p. 388-389).

The difficulties in attempting to distinguish between just wars and unjust wars has increasingly meeting are known. Leaving aside for now the wars of defense, the common denominator of all theories has always been the recognition of iusta due to these wars of aggression, which aims to repair a wrong done or the punishment of the guilty. In this way the war was treated as a judicial procedure, that is, a device to resolve a dispute arose between those who do not obey a common law. But this assimilation has come to highlight the weakness of the theory (Joseph, 2006, p. 388-389).

In any judicial stand the process of cognition and execution process. At first glance it may seem that the war lends itself to justify the comparison with the judicial process at least as regards the implementation process: the war as an enforcement or penalty, in a word war as a penalty, i.e. the force at the service of law (Sharp, 2005, p. 384-388). As regards the process of cognition? In this respect the theory shows a serious weakness, at least for two reasons: a process of cognition is more able to ensure the discrimination of right and wrong, and then to establish a boundary line between right and wrong, as is inspired by two fundamental principles of the certainty of judgment criteria and fairness of who should judge (Sharp, 2005, p. 384-388). In the declaration and implementation of a war, neither the one nor the other principles are respected: not the first, because the long tradition of theories of just war has failed in its attempt to establish a set of commonly accepted criteria (in order there was no war that was in this or that doctrine of justification to their own criteria), not the second, because those who decide the justice or injustice of war is the same party, not a judge over the parties. From these two characters that distinguish the declaration and implementation of a war ...