IS CALIBRATION

IS calibration of sanctions on terrorism threats

IS calibration of sanctions on terrorism threats

Summary of the research

While economic sanctions remain an attractive tool of coercion in international politics, they have a poor record of altering the behavior of major powers such as China and India over the past quarter century. U.S. sanctions against China following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 were resisted by the George H.W. Bush administration, which was eager to engage Beijing and advance Sino-American economic ties. After the Pokhran-II nuclear tests in 1998, India was also able to withstand American sanctions that were opposed by key members of the U.S. Congress. In both cases, multilateral economic sanctions were also undermined by the reluctance of key U.S. allies, including Japan in the case of China and France in the case of India. There were considerable differences between the two cases in terms of U.S. objectives, Chinese and Indian vulnerabilities, and levels of uncertainty. But taken together, they suggest that economic sanctions are difficult to impose and almost impossible to sustain against major powers in a globalized world. This, in turn, has several implications for the theory and practice of international relations, hastening the onset of multipolarity, questioning the inevitability of interdependent peace, and suggesting a continuing need for the United States to maintain its military superiority in a peaceful globalized world. Therefore, this is the overall summary of the research.

Outline description of the proposed research project

For many years, the United States has employed economic sanctions in order to condition, coerce or contain states believed to be acting against American interests and values. By imposing costs without the degree of risk associated with military force, economic sanctions remain an attractive option for U.S. policy-makers. Many also believe that economic sanctions are more effective in a world that is increasingly globalized and interdependent but are economic sanctions or the threat of economic sanctions, effective as a punitive measure against major powers, i.e. potential peer competitors of the United States? As the United States adapts to a world of fast-rising powers such as China and India, this question may come to assume greater significance.

If indeed such sanctions are effective as tools of coercion against major states, a continuation of the post-Cold War trend of stronger U.S.-led institutions and primarily cooperative relations between centers of power appears more likely. Sanctions would enable the United States to influence other major states without resorting to the use of force, thereby preserving a global system that advances American interests. However, the futility of U.S. sanctions against China and India over the past two decades suggests that this is unlikely to be the case. After the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the United States was unable to alter Beijing's approach to human rights and political dissent. And following India's 1998 nuclear tests, the threat and use of sanctions by Washington failed to dissuade India from its pursuit of a nuclear deterrent. These cases suggest that two often overlooked variables, ...