Today there are at least three views among Chinese elites of the international system and China's role in it. All three start from the implicit premise that today's international system has not changed in its essence from the 19th century: the world is composed of strong and weak nation-states that vie for dominance on the global stage (Cui, 2008). They differ, however, on whether this state of affairs is permanent and on what global role China should seek. Some assert that the international system still revolves around Western interests that aim to subjugate and humiliate weaker nations, and that China's bitter experiences during the Century of Humiliation should provide a cautionary tale about the dangers of this system. A second viewpoint suggests that the current system is acceptable now that China can play a prominent role in it. They assert that China's period of humiliation has ended, and that China should now seek to ensure the stability of the system and to assure other nations of its commitment to doing so. This view suggests that the potential dangers of a competitive international system can be mitigated by adapting existing institutions and practices. A third line of reasoning suggests that China is in a unique position to fundamentally remake the international system because its experiences of shame and subjugation have given the Chinese people an alternative vision of how international relations can and should be conducted. This paper focuses rather on the universe of possible arguments that have been proposed in China in recent years, while acknowledging that different arguments have held stronger sway at different times.
Analysis
The Century of Humiliation opened in 1839-42, when the British government forced China to open its ports to the opium trade. In the eyes of most Chinese today it did not end until the Chinese Communist Party won the civil war in 1949 and began to rebuild China's domestic order and international standing. The litany of indignities that China suffered at the hands of foreigners during this period is long and well known (Cohen, 2003). Prior to this point, China's rulers had sat comfortably at the center of a ring of tributary relationships, and their familiarity with any civilization outside of Asia was minimal. Yet starting in the 1840s China was compelled by force of arms into a semi-colonial position, ceding large pieces of its territory to Western nations and Japan, including ports along the coast and the Yangtze River, Manchuria, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. This shame was further compounded in the 1910s and '20s by independence movements in Tibet and Mongolia and by further Japanese incursions into Manchuria. During this period, China lost nearly a third of its territory of effective control. Internally, China was riven throughout the 19th century by massive rebellions and uprisings, which were frequently fanned by popular opposition to the growing foreign presence and to what many Chinese subjects viewed as ...