A common attitude prevails that the juice has ages before been pushed out of the free-will argument, and that no new champion can manage more than moderately hot up stale contentions which every individual has heard. This is a fundamental mistake. I understand of no subject less damaged out, or in which inventive genius has a better possibility of breaking open new ground--not, possibly, of compelling a deduction or of forcing assent, but of deepening our sense of what the topic between the two parties actually is, of what the concepts of destiny and of free will imply.
At our very edge nearly, in the past couple of years, we have glimpsed dropping in fast succession from the press works that present the alternate in solely innovative lights. Not to talk of the English disciples of Hegel, for example Green and Bradley; not to talk of Hinton and Hodgson, neither of Hazards here --we glimpse in the writings of Renouvier, Fouillée, and Delbœuf how absolutely altered and refreshed is the pattern of all the vintage disputes. I will not imagine vying in uniqueness with any of the experts I have entitled, and my ambition restricts itself to just one little point. If I can make two of the inevitably inferred corollaries of determinism coherent to you than they have been made before, I will have made it likely for you to conclude for or contrary to that doctrine with a better comprehending of what you are about. And if you favor not to conclude at all, but to stay doubters, you will at least glimpse more plainly what the subject of your hesitation is.
I therefore disclaim in an open way on the threshold all pretension to verify to you that the flexibility of the will ...