GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Global Governance Reflects the Interests of the Most Powerful States

Global Governance Reflects the Interests of the Most Powerful States

Introduction

The second decade of the 21st century is the next, already very advanced stage of global transformation. Its distinguishing feature is the fact that despite all attempts to reinvent the international institutional infrastructure, global governance is in increasingly deep decline. Even the most powerful and influential player's no longer lay claim to the ability to control the course of events.

The G20 emerged in a moment of highest panic, when the most urgent need was to calm down markets, and then it showed itself to be a very successful instrument. Further attempts to turn the G20 into a key body for global governance faced objective difficulties, because, to use the expression of George Orwell, “all animals are equal, but some are more equal than others”. The “more equal” once shaped the informal G4—US, China, Euro zone mainly represented by Germany, and Japan (so far)

Those countries are essential to discuss issues of global economic governance; the rest are more or less visible entourage, which can have certain influence but not in a decisive manner. That inevitably creates problems of legitimacy, which is also applicable to the G8, and does not provide the framework for settlement of political problems. Meanwhile, the current international troubles are mostly of a political nature.

International Environment—More Complex And Chaotic

The international environment is getting more complex in many ways. First, there is the growing gap between the world economic system, which is becoming increasingly integrated and global, on the one hand, and the system of political relations, on the other. The latter is still based on national priorities and also shows signs of weakening influence of all inter- and supranational (to a greater degree) bodies in contrast to national sovereignties. The combination of economic interdependence and of the political and ideological incompatibility is getting quite common. Intricate relations between Russia and the EU, and especially those between the US and China, are the most obvious examples of this kind.

Second, international relations have been getting more “democratic”, and individual countries more “emancipated.” (The “Arab Spring” is a vivid manifestation of the latter process. The main purpose of the protests was the updating and strengthening of the nation states in the Arab world, with the 110 G20: Perceptions and Perspectives for Global Governance most likely net effect of greater sovereignty of countries in the region and a rise of nationalism.) Bloc discipline, typical of the Cold War era, is finally giving way to independent policies by not only large players, but also medium-sized ones. Countries that just fifteen years ago remained loyal members of stable alliances (for example, France and Turkey), and of systems of relations (Egypt and Pakistan), or did not show any far-reaching ambitions (Brazil and Iran) are now ever more often determined to play their own game.

The desire to participate in international relations does not necessarily mean the ability to play a constructive and effective role in ...