FINAL PAPER

Final paper

Final paper

Introduction

Ecologists typically invoke "lawlike" generalizations, ranging over "structural" and/or "functional" kinds, in order to explain generalizations about "historical" kinds (such as biological taxa) - rather than vice versa. This practice is justified, since structural and functional kinds tend to correlate better with important ecological phenomena than do historical kinds. I support these contentions with three recent case studies. (Kull, C., Ibrahim, C., & Meredith, T. 2007)

"Natural science traditionally concerns itself with at least three tasks. The first is to discover the geography and history of the universe… A second task is to discover what sorts of thing and what sorts of property there are in the universe… The third task is to state the laws which the things in space and time obey(Kull, C., Ibrahim, C., & Meredith, T. 2007). Philosophers, historians, and scientists (e.g., Sismondo 2000, Kingsland 1995, and Brown and Gibson 1983, respectively) often portray the discipline of ecology as in a frequent, if not constant, state of tension. On one side in the tug of war is the idiographic, or historical, penchant for detailing the spatio-temporal trajectories of particular organisms, populations, communities, and/or ecosystems. On the other side is the nomothetic impulse to uncover timeless truths applicable to all ecological entities. Of course, ecology would not be the fascinating subject that it is today without the vigorous development of both research modes. And of course, the two approaches ideally not only co-exist, but also inform and enhance one another. However, it is still possible to ask which is more important to achieving success in the explanation, prediction, and management of ecological systems. Idle curiosity, limited resources for ecological research, and pressing environmental concerns all conspire to motivate this question. (Kull, C., Ibrahim, C., & Meredith, T. 2007)

Explanation

In ecology, as in any science, classifying the objects of interest is a prerequisite to explaining their behavior. Ecologists typically categorize their objects in one of three ways: according to their internal structures, their relationships to external environments, or their origins and/or current locations in space and time. In other words, ecologists tend to sort things into what I shall call "structural kinds", "functional kinds", or "historical kinds". Philosophers have long held that laws of nature cannot range over sets of objects defined in terms of particular times, places, and/or individuals. This criterion disqualifies generalizations about historical kinds (what I will call "historical generalizations"). But it leaves open the possibility that (some) generalizations about structural and/or functional kinds in ecology are genuine laws. (Kull, C., Ibrahim, C., & Meredith, T. 2007) For this reason, I shall henceforth refer to these latter generalizations as "lawlike". I will argue that lawlike generalizations play a justifiably more important role in ecological explanations than do historical generalizations. This conclusion suggests that ecology is - and should be - a primarily nomothetic, or law-oriented, rather than idiographic, or historically-oriented, science. (Kull, C., Ibrahim, C., & Meredith, T. 2007)

I offer three case studies in support of this ...