Fassfud Hostage Rescue Mission

Table of Contents

Introduction3

Information Warfare Mission (IW plan)4

Review of Campaign Planning and the Systems Approach5

Concept of Operational Architectures8

Integrated Computer Aided Manufacturing (ICAM) DEFinition Method (IDEF) The concept of operational architectures and IDEF is not new.10

Explanation of Operational Architectures Elements Using IDEF11

Operational Concept12

IW Operational timeline12

Modified Fassfud Threat Lay Down Image22

Physical Architecture25

Operational (Static) Architecture25

Conclusion26

Fassfud Hostage Rescue Mission

Introduction

The Irregular Warfare Support (IWS) Program develops adaptive and agile ways and means to support irregular warfare in current and evolving strategic environments. IWS supports joint, interagency, and international partners who conduct irregular warfare through indirect and asymmetric approaches with solutions to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. IWS identifies material and nonmaterial solutions via operational analysis, concept development, field experimentation, and spiral delivery of capabilities to defeat the motivations, sanctuaries, and enterprises of targeted state and non-state actors. Bringing back the propeller-driven fighter in the age of counterinsurgency may seem to some a belated no-brainer or to others a wasteful diversion with potentially suicidal risk to the pilot (Bologna, 1993).

As late as early 2008, the leadership of the US Air Force sided firmly with the sceptics. Lt Gen Donald Hoffman, then the USAF's top-ranking acquisition official, implied to a group of reporters in April of that year that the idea of deploying propeller-driven aircraft in modern combat is too risky.

It is this combination that drove the type out of the USAF inventory immediately after the Vietnam war, with the retirements of the Douglas A-1 Skyraider, the Cessna O-2 Skymaster and the de Havilland C-7 Caribou. Paradoxically, however, the propeller-driven aircraft's ability to fly low and slow for long periods is responsible for a rebirth of enthusiasm within the USAF since shortly after Hoffman made his remarks about reintroducing the P-51. The USAF leadership's position on the light attack mission would quickly evolve in 2008, even as the service's top leadership was fired - partly for moving too slowly to support a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan (Bologna, 1993).

Information Warfare Mission (IW plan)

The scene is 1988. An energetic, forward-thinking young man wants to enter the new computer age and thus visits a local computer store. The store salesman approaches the young man and asks how he may be of assistance. The young man replies "I need a computer-probably a 386; what model do you recommend?" The salesman returns with a question- What do you want the computer to do for you? The young man, puzzled if not deflated, replies, "I just need a computer." In many ways the Department of Defense (DOD) is in a similar situation with regard to information warfare. It is certain it needs to use information warfare, but it is not entirely clear on how or why. As pointed out in the previous chapter, the DOD has not yet been able to fully determine what it wants to get from information warfare, or how it wants to get it, in part because of the lack of agreement on what it is, and in part because a wealth of historical experience ...