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EXCEL COURSEWORK

Excel Coursework

Excel Coursework

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The purpose of the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) is to describe how future joint force commanders (JFCs) could conduct protracted IW to accomplish national strategic objectives in the 2014-2026 timeframe. The JOC will guide the development and integration of Department of Defense (DOD) military concepts and capabilities for waging protracted IW on a global or regional scale against hostile states and armed groups. The JOC will provide a basis for further IW discussion, debate, and experimentation intended to influence subsequent IW concept and capability development. It will also influence joint and Service combat development processes by helping the joint force gain a better appreciation for IW challenges that will result in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) changes. JFCs and their Interagency (IA) and multinational partners will use this JOC to assess potential integration challenges and opportunities. The overall desired end state is a joint force with enhanced capability for IW and a balanced approach to warfighting that allows the joint force to be as compelling in IW as it is in conventional warfare (Berkun, 2005,, 59).

The IW JOC broadly describes operational-level solutions to how future JFCs will conduct protracted IW in combination with other available instruments of national power and in concert with our state and non-state partners to achieve strategic objectives. This concept describes IW as a form of warfare and addresses the implications of IW becoming the dominant form of warfare, not only by our adversaries but also by the United States and its partners. This JOC applies across the range of military operations and relies heavily on the pre-conflict activities described in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) and the other JOCs. It does not provide a tactical description of how to conduct IW operations but instead introduces new conditions and capability needs for IW (Berkun, 2005,, 59).

IW is a complex, “messy,” and ambiguous social phenomenon that does not lend itself to clean, neat, concise, or precise definition (see the call-out box on page 5). This JOC uses the term in two contexts. First, IW is a form of armed conflict. As such, it replaces the term “low-intensity conflict.” Second, IW is a form of warfare. As such, it encompasses insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism, raising them above the perception that they are somehow a lesser form of conflict below the threshold of warfare.

The nature of warfare in the 21st century remains as it has been since ancient times - “a violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by the use of military force.” These organized groups are no longer limited to states with easily identifiable regular armed forces, nor do they all operate by internationally accepted conventions and standards (Dobson, 2003,, 102).

IW includes a wide variety of indirect operations and activities that occur in isolation or within “traditional” inter-state combat operations. Some IW activities, such as terrorism and transnational crime, violate international ...
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