DISABLED CHILD IN TODAY'S SOCIETY

Prospects for a Disabled Child in Today's Society Are Very limited

Prospects for a Disabled Child in Today's Society Are Very Limited

Hans Reinders's The Future of the Disabled in Today's Society thoughtfully analyses the implications of prenatal genetic testing for disabled citizens of liberal democracies. The central argument of Reinders's book is:

(1) The availability of prenatal genetic testing and abortion in liberal societies will make increasingly prevalent the view that bearing a disabled child is an irresponsible choice (Cohen? 2000? 225-55).

(2) The increasing prevalence of this view will erode general willingness publicly to support the disabled with long-term care? special education? social services and special employment opportunities? as well as the willingness to bring political pressure to bear on private insurers to pay for the care of the disabled.

(3) The erosion? if not stemmed or countered? would have the morally objectionable consequence that the disabled will not receive adequate care.

(4) If the erosion is countered? this will increasingly be by citizens whose willingness to care for the disabled themselves depends upon special motivations? particularly religious motivations.

(5) The decency of liberal societies will increasingly depend upon the existence of citizens with special motivations? especially religious motivations.

This might be read as a sociological argument about what makes liberal societies `work?' the conclusion of which is reminiscent of de Tocqueville's claim that the vigor of American democracy depends upon the presence of vital secondary associations? particularly churches. This reading is encouraged by Reinders's introduction of premises (1)? (2) and (4) as empirical assumptions (pp. 14-15). But Reinders clearly offers the argument as something more than sociological analysis. He intends it to ground critics of liberalism? one which raises pressing questions about the kind of people liberal culture produces? about their willingness to support the weak and vulnerable? and about liberalism's ability to account for the conditions of its own viability (Cohen? 2000? 225-55).

What this larger critics shows? Reinders thinks? is that there is a fundamental problem with the moral sources of liberalism ± that set of ideas? values and principles that liberals use to frame and justify policy? including health care policy. But (and this worry underlies the questions I want to raise about his critics) it is not clear which of two things Reinders thinks is wrong with liberalism's moral sources. Is the problem that they are too thin? impoverished or procedural to justify adequate care for the disabled? This is suggested by his early description of what he calls ``the liberal convention'' as a ``narrow'' and ``minimalist'' morality (pp. 21-22) that ``will do very little to safeguard the future of disabled people in our society'' (p. 36). Or is the problem supposed to be the quite different one that liberalism carries with it a rich set of values and ideals of character? but that they are the wrong ones to justify adequate care for the disabled? This? as we shall see? is suggested by some of Reinders's concluding remarks. Clearly liberalism cannot be guilty on both ...