CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

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Cuban Missile Crisis

Abstract

With the United States at the brink of war with the Soviet Union over missiles being placed in Cuba time cannot be wasted so immediate negotiations is crucial. While evidence shows missiles being assembled and posing a threat to the U.S. the Soviet leaders deny any such missiles being present and the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet's with the U.S. seem to be deteriorating even faster. In order to avoid a possible war the U.S. needs to move forward with negotiations with all parties to prevent an unthinkable war with countless lives lost. The U.S. must stand firm but also be willing to reach out and show the world our diplomatic stance can solve major issues between countries and their governments. Otherwise, war could be imminent and in the case of two superpowers there would be no winners.

Introduction

The Cuban Missile Crisis has had important long-term effects. Even during the crisis itself, some in the U.S. government were thinking ahead to the future. For example, we had argued for a tough stand on the removal of the missiles and the bombers, but also for movement toward a reduction in tensions after resolution of the crisis. In the memoranda of October 25 and 27, U.S. officials suggested that the United States should, while solving the Cuban base question with determination, forcefully reaffirm its readiness to reach agreements on arms control and disarmament and other broader diplomatic arrangements. (Kennedy, 1999) Those doves who argued most strongly for seeking to resolve the crisis through diplomatic means sought not only to find matching concessions, but also to use the occasion to advance a more far-reaching political agenda. By contrast, most hawks opposed any move toward a détente.

President Kennedy included in his key letter of October 27, as an incentive to Khrushchev, a statement that once the crisis was settled, the effect on easing tensions would make possible broader negotiations. And in his reply to Khrushchev's letter of October 28 he reiterated his agreement with Khrushchev that increased attention should be given to disarmament. There had not, however, been any consideration in the Ex Comm or decision by the president on specific disarmament or other negotiating positions beyond the terms of settlement of the immediate crisis. (Blight and Welch, 1998; 1989)

Negotiations

The main work on possible future negotiations with the Soviet Union was carried out by a group under the guidance of Walt Rostow. On November 9, after the crisis had passed its peak, a paper on "Post-Cuba [Crisis] Negotiations with the USSR" was circulated to the Ex Comm. It foreshadowed negotiations for a hot line, nuclear nonproliferation, curbing space weapons, and other arms control measures. Khrushchev on October 27 had specifically called for renewed nuclear test ban negotiations, and President Kennedy had agreed in his letter of October 28 acknowledging Khrushchev's acceptance of the settlement offered (George, 2003). In the private exchanges between the two leaders in November and December, not published with the October crisis correspondence, as the more immediate ...