CONTRACT LAW UK CASE

Contract Law UK Case



Contract Law UK Case

"British" refers to the United Kingdom, a nation state made up of four constituent countries: England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. England and Wales both come under English law, while Scotland and Northern Ireland have their own legal systems. Although many elements of the systems are similar or identical, there are some key differences. The United Kingdom is made up of separate countries with individual legal systems. An individual or company that seeks to act under "British" contract law will need to be clear about which legal system it comes under. Depending on which system applies, there are several important differences in principle and application of contract law (Beale, 2007) (Censer, 2009).

In England, Northern Ireland and Wales, it is not possible to sign a binding contract in which one party simply gives something to the other without getting anything in return. In Scotland, such a contract is valid (and known as a gratuitous contact), but must be signed or otherwise agreed by both parties. In all forms of British law, a contract must be agreed by both parties. In Scottish law, however, there is provision for a "unilateral promise." This is not a contract, but rather a legally enforceable commitment by the party agreeing to the specified action, and does not require the other party's approval (Beale, 2007) (Censer, 2009).

English law has a concept named "equity" that applies in most cases, including contract law. Equity means that a court has the power to override the strict letter of written (or statute) law where it believes that to apply the statute law strictly would be contrary to the interest of fairness and justice. Scottish law does not recognize this concept.

The distinction vindicates the central case of contract law, which is the idea that promises are made to be kept. The suggestion that contractual primary liabilities were only important. It would be the theoretical basis for the award of damages for non performance is no longer sustainable. The regret expressed that there was no means of giving effect to the legal right to performance (43) could at last be remedied. The boldest implementation of the distinction can be seen in the judgments of the great Australian judge, Windeyer J, (44) who was then cited as ratio script on the matter of relief in English cases, notably Beswick v Beswick (Beatson, 2002). The case of Lord Diplock did not use the concept of secondary liabilities, and only referred to the narrow distinction, giving "secondary obligation" the meaning of damages. Secondary liabilities comprise not only damages, but the whole range of remedies. The former approach bears the mark of the historical absence of English law for the relief. Lord Diplock evolved on this ground. Drawing the wider distinction is novel because it has the merit of asserting a hierarchy in contractual obligations that there is a primary liability to perform, and specifically equitable remedies can be awarded to execute it by ...