The Angolan civil war is the longest running conflict of the modern world and one of the most difficult to understand. Many people expected that, like the civil war in Mozambique, it would die down with the end of the Cold War, which had sustained the conflict with transfusions of ideology and military material. But the war has continued with scarcely unabated virulence, leaving those who have worked for an end to the conflict with a feeling of exhaustion and despair.
As Angola approached independence in 1975, the United States found itself in the unenviable position of having supported the wrong side in the liberation struggle.
In deference to Portugal, its NATO partner, the United States did not support the cause for an independent Angola; but independence was inevitable. Washington's response was to support the foes of the Soviet-supported MPLA. Despite this support, it was the MPLA which eventually organized the new government and was accorded recognition by virtually the entire international community at independence. However, following a precedent set when it denied recognition to the communist Soviet Union in 1917 and to communist China 1949, the United States refused to recognized it. The American contention was that Angola could not be considered independent as long as Cuban troops remained in the country. This was clearly not the test which the United States had used to determine whether a nation was independent in other instances. This essay analyzes the dual role played by the United States in the Angolan civil war that erupted following Angola's independence in 1975(Chabal 2002).
Discussion With the situation in Angola fluid, the Soviet leadership had basically two options: (1) to do nothing or (2) to intervene on behalf of the MPLA. To understand why the Politburo opted for the second, one must examine several important variables: Soviet objectives and stakes in Angola, domestic and bureaucratic politics, the risks of intervention, and the Cuban factor.
What were the Soviet objectives and how high were the Soviet stakes in Angola? Soviet objectives were essentially complementary and nonconflicting. Soviet leaders were, of course, aware of the strategic importance of the former Portuguese colonies. One surmises that they hoped to obtain at least a strategic foothold by means of naval facilities on the Angolan coast. There is evidence that they were aware of the enormous economic potential of Angola's oil and minerals. As one Soviet analyst observed, "It has not been ruled out" that Angola "is the richest country on the African continent, not counting South Africa."
Perhaps most important, Angola provided the Soviets with an opportunity to weaken the influence of their two main rivals-- China and the United States--by checking the growth of Chinese influence in Africa, which occurred during the "second scramble," and by preventing the victory of the Chinese and U.S.-backed forces of the FNLA and UNITA. Angola, because of its geographic position, also mattered in terms of the Soviet endeavor to ...